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In Chapter 1, we study the relationship between the target value creation and acquirer 
corporate governance measures.  We show that, based on the 2-day, 5-day and 10day 
announcement windows, the targets acquired by companies with more antitakeover 
provisions (ATP) experience higher announcement returns.  We also study the link 
between acquirer’s corporate governance measure and net synergistic effects on the 
capital market.  We find that high-ATP acquirers engage in mergers that are not only 
destructive to their own firm values, but as a whole high-ATP acquirers also on 
average make acquisitions that yield lower net synergistic values.  We also study the 
acquirer returns to confirm MWX’s results.  Lastly, we examine the impacts of G-
indices on combined company’s value changes in asymmetric windows, and we find 
the breakeven G-indices under which the net synergistic effects tend to be positive for 
different windows.  In Chapter 2, we examine the relationship between various types 
of market shares and net interest margins in the Taiwanese banking industry.  The 
study uses previously untapped Taiwanese banking data with more than 5000 
observations and three model specifications over a 19-year span.  The results show 
that the market shares have positive and statistically significant impacts on net interest 
margins for most aggregate samples.  But the results also show that as the banking 
industry became saturated and banks began engaging in pricing wars and risky lending, 
the deposit and branch market shares have had negative impacts on bank spreads since 
2001.  The credit lending market share became a much more important factor for 
profitability; it was less important before around 2001 because (non-collateralized) 
credit lending was not as prevalent, and the market for credit cards or cash cards,  
which yield higher interest rates, was small.  The results support the argument for 
further industry consolidation to build healthier and larger financial institutions. 
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CHAPTER 1    
ACQUIRER CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, TARGET VALUE CREATION 
AND NET SYNERGIES 
Introduction 
Corporate governance has been an area of focus by both scholars and investors in the 
past decade.  It is especially true after the Enron and WorldCom scandals in which the 
managers profited at the expense of the shareholders.  Aside from the CEO and board 
separation and the independence of the board members, the number of antitakeover 
provisions (ATPs) is another proxy for the quality of corporate governance.  ATPs are 
set in place to protect the managers.   It means that the more antitakeover provisions a 
firm has, the harder it is to unseat the managers through a takeover.  It also implies 
that the more antitakeover provisions there are in a company, the less protection the 
shareholders have against poor management practices.   
In this paper, we examine target value creation, acquirer corporate governance 
measures, and their combined net synergistic effect on the capital market.  We 
contribute to the series of literature in the area of corporate governance and merger 
synergies.  Specifically, we extend the paper by MWX in which they examine the 
relationship between the acquirer corporate governance and the value destruction upon 
merger announcements.   
Although the agency problem has been an area of academic studies for decades, to the 
author’s knowledge, scholars have only recently begun conducting empirical analyses 
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based on corporate governance measures.  Core, Holthausen and Larcker (1999) give 
support to the negative relationship between a firm’s corporate governance measure 
and its agency problem, and they show that firms with agency problems perform 
worse than their peers.  After Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s (2003, hereon referred to 
as “GIM”) milestone paper in which they first began using ATPs for corporate 
governance research, the most frequently cited paper related to corporate governance 
was written by MWX.  They show that firms with many ATPs tend to make value-
destroying acquisitions.   In our study, we extend their argument and study the target 
investor’s reaction to acquirers’ corporate governance measures, and we take a step 
further to examine the net synergistic effect of the acquisitions on the capital market.   
The proxy for corporate governance we use in this paper is the number ATPs a firm 
has.  ATPs were originally created in the 1980s to protect a corporation from being 
taken over by corporate raiders.  However, as the hostile takeover tactics faded into 
the woodwork as the U.S economy entered a recession at the end of 1980s, the ATPs 
evolved and became the managers’ tools to protect themselves from being unseated 
whether they are acting in the shareholders’ best interests or not.   
For a firm that does not have ATPs in place, when it performs poorly, another firm can 
acquire it and replace the top managers.  With sufficient number of ATPs, managers 
can be less cautious and make poor business decisions such as engaging in expensive 
M&A buying sprees or risky projects, but they are protected from the market for 
corporate control.  Firms with more ATPs are much less attractive to a potential 
acquirer since it would be more costly to take them over.  Many ATPs, most 
prominently the poison pill, can significantly raise the acquisition cost for the acquirer.  
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Therefore, as a result of many ATPs, executives of the firm can stand to make poor 
decisions without being punished through the means of a takeover.   
In this paper, we contend that the market can determine, based on available 
information, whether high-ATP acquirers cause the target prices to increase more 
because of their tendency to overpay.  The paper consists of Part I and Part II 
following the introduction and the literature review.  To be clear, each part has its own 
hypotheses, regression models, methodologies and analyses.  Parts of the models and 
methodologies are the same, but we include them in both parts. 
Part I: Acquirer Corporate Governance and Target Value Creation  
Theory and Hypothesis 
In this section we establish the link between an acquirer’s corporate governance 
measure and a target’s value change upon a merger announcement.  We examine how 
stock market participants interpret merger announcements made by firms with 
differing numbers of ATPs.  The number of ATPs is a proxy for a firm’s management 
quality – the more ATPs a company has, the worse the management quality.   
Assuming the market absorbs information relatively efficiently, we contend that when 
high-ATP acquirers make a bid for targets, the target shareholders will profit more 
from them in spite of the worse corporate governance measures that the targets will 
eventually adopt.  In other words, when a higher-ATP acquirer's value decreases after 
a merger announcement, then its target’s value should increase more. This creates a 
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wealth transfer mechanism between the acquirer shareholders and the target 
shareholders.  
As mentioned, it has been shown by MWX that when acquirers with many ATPs make 
acquisitions, their contemporaneous share prices decrease more severely, indicating 
that the market evaluates this decision unfavorably and believes that these acquisitions 
are poor investments.  Part I addresses the following key questions: Do targets respond 
more favorably to acquirers with high ATPs upon merger announcements?  Since a 
target eventually adopts the acquirer’s corporate governance, does a low-G acquirer’s 
better corporate governance measures increase the target value more than the “high-G 
premium?”  
 Methodology 
The basic methodology follows MWX.  The M&A data are based on the Securities 
Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S Acquisitions database.  We identify 1427 acquisitions 
between January 1990 and December 2007 that meet the following criteria: 
1. Public acquirers incorporated in the U.S. 
2. Public targets incorporated in the U.S. 
3. Transaction value of more than $1 million. 
4. In a given transaction, the acquirer controls less than 50% of its target’s shares 
prior to the announcement and owns 100% of the target’s shares after the 
transaction 
5. In a given transaction, the acquirer has annual financial statement information 
available from Compustat and stock return data (210 trading days prior to 
5 
 
acquisition announcements) from the University of Chicago’s Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock Price and Returns file. 
6. Targets have beta less than 10 and more than -10. 
7. The acquirer is included in the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s 
(IRRC) database of antitakeover provisions. 
The IRRC published eight volumes in years 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 
2004 and 2006.  These volumes provide information on ATPs for about 1,500 firms 
these years.  Following MWX and GIM, we assume that during the years between two 
consecutive publications, firms have the same ATPs as in the previous publication 
year.  Based on the empirical standpoint, it does not affect the results much if we 
assume that the firms have the same corporate governance as the next publication year.  
IRRC includes firms of the S&P 500 index and some others include the firms on the 
annual lists of the largest corporations published by Forbes, BusinessWeek and 
Fortune magazines1.   Based on MWX, the IRRC database represents about 90% of 
the U.S. stock market capitalization in each volume, and the more recent volumes 
include more firms.  The number of ATPs a firm has is then used to compose a 
corporate-governance index, or G-index.  Criterion 6 filters out observations that may 
have had data errors.  This means that a stock tends to follow the broad-base market 
index by more than ten times the fluctuation.  It only affects three observations in our 
sample.  
We measure the target value creation by a market model adjusted stock returns around 
initial acquisition announcements, following conventional practices of event studies.  
                                                           
11
 The methodology and the description of the IRRC database largely follows Masulis, Wang and Xie 
(2007). 
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The 2-day, 5-day and 10-day windows’ cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are 
computed.  The 2-day window’s CAR includes the returns of the two days before and 
after the announcement day and announcement day itself, hence it contains five total 
days.  The 5-day and 10-day windows’ CARs follow the same logic.  The CARs are 
the value creation effects based on the merger announcements.  Following MWX, we 
use the CRSP equal-weighted return as the market return and estimate the market 
model over the 200-day period from event day -210 to event day -11 in order to 
capture stock run-ups: 
 
,  
where i is each merger deal’s corresponding target.  is the target daily stock return 
on day t, where t = 0 is the merger announcement day from the market model.  We 
also obtain , the market alpha and  , the target market beta. r differs from t such 
that r is the time periods within our preset windows, which ranges from 10 days before 
until 10 days after the merger announcement. 
   
 
is the target daily abnormal return within the event window, and:  
 
Based on Da Graca and Masson (2009), we also extract 	, the target’s variance 
based on the model, which serves as an indication as to whether the market model is 
good in predicting each target’s stock performance. Mathematically, 	  is the 
squared standard deviation with respect to    in a regression based on the above 
market model.  The reason to extract this information is because the market model 
often gives poor predictions; in other words, some individual stocks follow the broad-
Rit = α it + β itmRmt + it
^
 ir = R ir − α i + β imRmr r ∈ −10,+10
^
ir
10dayCAR i =  ∏
r=−10
1 + ir  − 1
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based indices poorly.  The CARs are dependent on the predictive power of each firms’ 
respective market model, and if the variance is large, that means the abnormal returns 
inferred from these models are not precise.  In the following regressions, we use an 
inverse-variance weighting (as in Generalized Least Squares) and assign more weight 
to firms that experience lower variances during the 200-day periods.   
Below, Table 1 provides the basic statistical summary of the data we use to conduct 
the analyses.  The Mean Target Market Value of Equity is the averaged market values 
of targets on merger announcement days.  This information is provided to serve as a 
contrast to the Mean Deal Value, which is the averaged value of total deal values in a 
given year.  As shown on Table 1, the Mean Deal Value tends to be higher than the 
Mean Target Market Value of Equity.  The Offering Price/ Target Earnings Ratio 
indicates how much an acquirer is paying for each dollar of its target’s earnings per 
year.  These numbers vary widely according to the market conditions, but generally 
speaking, the higher the ratio is, the more an acquirer is paying (or overpaying) for the 
target’s potential synergies.  
Empirical Results 
 
In the following sections, we base our discussions on three key categories of variables: 
the target value creation (CAR) as the dependent variable, the G-index as the 
explanatory variable of interest, and the control variables of interest which include the 
deal characteristics, acquirer characteristics, macroeconomic effects on the M&A 
industry and penny-stock considerations.  The analyses are based on a Generalized 
Least Squares method with the VAR that we obtain for each observation the inverse  
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Table 1 
Sample Distribution by Announcement Year 
The sample consists of 1456 completed U.S mergers and acquisitions as given by SDC between 1990 
and 2007.  All firms are covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. 
Year 
Number of 
Acquisitions 
Percentage of 
Sample 
Mean Target 
Market Value 
of Equity 
($mil) 
Mean Deal 
Value ($mil) 
Offering Price/ 
Target Earnings 
Ratio2 
1990 28 1.92% 463 465 36.9 
1991 32 2.20% 470 525 54.2 
1992 37 2.54% 326 342 30.4 
1993 49 3.37% 522 500 31.5 
1994 41 2.82% 685 651 57.3 
1995 82 5.63% 1201 1237 35.5 
1996 82 5.63% 1302 1405 32.0 
1997 98 6.73% 1150 1201 106.2 
1998 171 11.74% 2475 2634 69.9 
1999 176 12.09% 2086 2257 191.2 
2000 147 10.10% 3281 3548 46.6 
2001 101 6.94% 1178 1311 71.9 
2002 57 3.91% 1541 1566 42.9 
2003 79 5.43% 1470 1507 68.4 
2004 65 4.46% 2557 2668 36.9 
2005 72 4.95% 4081 4237 28.3 
2006 66 4.53% 2090 2133 62.3 
2007 73 5.01% 1779 1852 35.4 
variance weighting3.  Regression results based on Ordinary Least Squares are provided 
in the Appendix.  The following are the variable summaries: 
                                                           
2
 There are significant outliers in 1997 and 1999, but we decided not to drop these observations since 
they are provided straight from the database and do not change the overall results. 
3
 Da Graca and Masson (2009) proposed a better methodology for event studies by performing event 
studies using a Generalized Least Squares (GLS) approach to estimation rather than the typical 
traditional approach, which imposes the assumption of homoscedasticity in the second stage estimation.  
They demonstrated that the GLS model is far more powerful by contrasting p-values for the full data set.  
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Table 2: Summary of Percentage Changes of Target CARs 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2-Day Combined Target CAR 1427 0.263158 0.267763 -0.3671 2.520148 
5-Day Combined Target CAR 1427 0.277139 0.278775 -0.21971 2.635234 
10-Day Combined Target CAR 1427 0.301628 0.311512 -0.51945 3.463247 
 
Table 3: Summary of Independent and Control Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
G-Index 9.310441 2.633993 1 17 
Cash Dummy 0.4849334 0.4999482 0 1 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 2.313785 3.35265 0.4613136 78.56468 
Acquirer Leverage4 0.1472411 0.1264589 0 0.7703276 
Acquirer Free Cash Flows 0.0460007 0.0746202 -0.342581 0.3531846 
Acquirer Assets5 8.656828 1.734835 3.28515 14.07155 
Table 3 Continued 
Relative Deal Size6 0.6647129 5.52885 0.0014006 137.2205 
Acquirer High Tech Dummy 0.278206 0.4482725 0 1 
Target High Tech Dummy 0.2915207 0.454622 0 1 
Transaction Value7 6.077552 1.646428 1.47819 12.01217 
Acq High Tech X Relative Deal Size 0.3662622 5.476155 0 137.2205 
Diversifying Dummy 0.6489138 0.4774772 0 1 
Deal Characteristics 
Here we examine the relationship between target abnormal returns and acquirer’s 
corporate governance measures, controlling for deal characteristics.  The regression 
model includes each acquirer’s G-index, the cash dummy, log deal value and whether 
the acquirer and target are in the high-tech industries.  
                                                           
4
  Acquirer leverage is the book value of debt over the market value of total assets.  The market value of 
assets is usually larger than the book value of assets, so the leverage ratio tends to be smaller than if the 
book value of assets is used. 
5
 Acquirer assets is the logged value of assets in $millions. 
6
 The relative deal size is defined as the logged deal size over the logged acquirer size.  The large 
number could be the result of acquirer size being close to 1. 
7
 Transaction value is the logged transaction value in $millions. 
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Table 4 shows that, in accordance with the theory developed in the last section, the 
targets experience higher abnormal returns when the acquirers have higher G-indices.  
The results are consistent for 10-day, 5-day and 2-day windows.  In other words, 
controlling for deal characteristics, the target experiences more value creation when 
the acquisition is announced by an acquirer with a higher G-index.   
Table 4 
Target Returns & G-index – Base Model 
The sample consists of 1,427 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent variable is 
the targets’ 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal returns around announcement 
dates. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant 
at 1%  
  
2-Day 
Window 
5-Day 
Window 
10-Day 
Window 
G-index 0.00265 0.00406+ 0.00402+ 
  (1.27) (1.92) (1.84) 
Transaction Value -0.01432* -0.01732* -0.02345* 
  (4.11) (4.90) (6.44) 
Cash-Dummy 0.07216* 0.06769* 0.05613* 
  (6.38) (5.90) (4.74) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.01354 0.01012 0.02104 
  (0.58) (0.42) (0.86) 
Target High-Tech 0.08456* 0.06563* 0.06708* 
  (3.62) (2.76) (2.74) 
Intercept 0.23492* 0.25194* 0.30914* 
  (7.31) (7.73) (9.20) 
Number of Obs 1427 1427 1427 
R-squared 0.06191 0.06269 0.06811 
There are several other factors that affect target abnormal returns.  First, target 
shareholders find cash to be more attractive as consideration.  A merger is usually 
considered to be a drastic strategic move, whether operationally or legally (with 
respect to board fiduciary duties). After a firm announces a merger, its stock price 
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tends to experience higher volatility, making equity payments more unstable.  It is an 
industry standard that a higher portion of cash in a deal is considered to be more 
attractive.  Therefore, we expect the mergers at least partially financed by cash to 
experience higher abnormal returns for target firms.   
The deal size also plays an important role in affecting the target CARs.  In mergers, if 
transactions’ absolute sizes are large, given limited financing resources, the acquirers 
will not be able to pay excessive premiums.  This curbs the managers’ ability to 
overpay, causing the target CARs to be lower.   
Whether the target is a high-tech firm also plays an important role in affecting the 
target’s CARs.  Company valuations depend largely on their growth rates.  In all 
valuation models, the expected growth rate can affect the price substantially.  High-
tech firms are considered to be fast-growing firms, so they are expected to be paid 
higher premiums for prospective growth.  The results are statistically significant for all 
event windows.   
Since MWX shows that acquirers with higher G-indices experience more severe value 
destruction around merger announcements, our finding supports the argument that 
these announcements form a wealth-transfer mechanism between acquirer and target 
shareholders.  This being said, we note that in Table 4 the statistical significance of the 
G-index is low, less than 90 percent for the 2-day window and less than 95 percent in 
the other windows.  So the support of the MWX interpretation is weak in this base 
model.  We turn to more powerful models below. 
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Adding Acquirer Characteristics 
Here we account for other relevant information of an acquisition such as a company’s 
financial and operating conditions.  Although the target characteristics are inherently 
important because we are studying the price responses of targets, COMPUSTAT does 
not have enough information on most targets.   
Looking at the acquisitions for which we have data on all three categories of 
characteristics (deal, acquirer and target), we have only 90 observations 
remaining.  Based on the sample, the ratio between the mean transaction value and the 
mean acquirer size is about 11.8%, meaning that on average targets are much smaller 
than acquirers.  It may be the reason there is insufficient data on the targets.  While 
ideally we would include all three sets of characteristics, the remaining sample 
provides insufficient information to run the model.  Therefore, only the acquirer 
characteristics are included in our study, which leaves us with 525 observations8.  The 
only target characteristic we use that does not affect the sample size is the high tech 
dummy for the target firms.   
Again, adding simply the acquiring firm characteristics reduces our sample size down 
to 525, but these observations, when run on the base model, yield results which are 
consistent with those in Table 4, indicating these 525 observations are representative 
of the entire sample.  The acquirer characteristics include acquirer Tobin’s Q, leverage 
ratio, free cash flow ratio, the relative deal size and whether it is a diversifying 
                                                           
8
 The statistical summaries of the 525 observations are provided in Part II. 
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acquisition and others.  The regression results based on the deal and acquirer 
characteristics are in the next page: 
 Table 5  
Target Returns & G-index – Adding Acquirer Characteristics 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variable is the targets’ 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; * significant at 1%   
  
2-Day 
Window 
5-Day 
Window 
10-Day 
Window 
G-index 0.00744+ 0.00773+ 0.00814** 
  (1.77) (1.85) (2.06) 
Transaction Value -0.01942** -0.02271** -0.03184* 
  (2.06) (2.44) (3.61) 
Cash-Dummy 0.09892* 0.09969* 0.09345* 
  (4.14) (4.21) (4.17) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.10955* -0.08542** -0.06292+ 
  (2.78) (2.19) (1.70) 
Target High-Tech 0.10478* 0.06350 0.03735 
  (2.63) (1.61) (1.00) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00370 0.00507 0.00749 
(0.40) (0.55) (0.87) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.08788 -0.18341** -0.15002+ 
(0.94) (1.98) (1.71) 
Acquirer FCF 0.37295+ 0.17567 0.11959 
(1.65) (0.78) (0.56) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00037 -0.00552 -0.00433 
(0.04) (0.58) (0.48) 
Diversifying Dummy 0.03219 0.05222** 0.04479** 
(1.38) (2.25) (2.04) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.02861** -0.03102** -0.02256+ 
(1.98) (2.17) (1.66) 
Acquirer Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.02864** 0.03028** 0.02120 
  (1.97) (2.10) (1.55) 
Intercept 0.23669** 0.32404* 0.38163* 
  (2.47) (3.42) (4.25) 
Number of Obs 525 525 525 
14 
 
Table 5 Continued 
R-squared 0.10015 0.10881 0.12114 
After controlling for these charactderistics, Table 5 provides consistent support for our 
hypothesis.  The G-index in this model is much more significant statistically than in 
the previous one, albeit still somewhat weak.  In this model, whether the acquirer is a 
high-tech firm is statistically significant, whereas the target’s industry does not affect 
the target CARs based on this model.  
It is interesting to note that based on our sample the acquirer’s leverage has the 
strongest effect on the target CARs.  It means that higher leveraged firms lead to lower 
target CARs.  There are three apparent possible interpretations.  First, investors are 
concerned with the financial management of the acquirer.  If an acquirer is in a weak 
financial position, acquiring other firms only further worsens its financial health.  
Second, highly-leveraged firms may have lower possibility and fewer resources to 
complete the deal.  Third, existing leverage limits reckless managers’ ability to 
overpay for a target, restricting the excessive premium expected by target shareholders. 
One reason to control for the target size stems from an argument made by Moeller, 
Schlingemann and Stulz (2004).  They find robust evidence that acquirer size is 
negatively correlated with the acquirer’s announcement-period CAR.  It is also a 
support for the managerial hubris hypothesis (Roll 1986) since they find that larger 
acquirers pay higher premiums.  MWX offers an alternative explanation such that 
large firm size serves as a rather effective takeover defense, since it requires more 
resources to acquire them.  Following their argument, if larger targets are harder to 
acquire simply because of their sheer sizes, then we should expect targets to 
experience lower CARs.  Our finding supports the above argument.   
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The Diversifying acquisition dummy has significant effects on target CARs for the 5-
day and 10-day windows.  We define a diversifying acquisition as when the acquirer 
and target have different four-digit SIC codes.  Targets experience higher CARs if the 
acquirer is from a different industry.     
In Table 5, the relative deal size is significant in all event windows: the smaller the 
ratio between the deal size and acquirer’s market capitalization, the larger are target 
CARs.  In a perfect world, all targets would be valued relatively correctly and both 
buyers and sellers would not have to negotiate the acquisition price.  This means that a 
justifiable premium is paid to the target despite the target size.  But in reality, whether 
a deal goes through depends largely on the premium that an acquirer is able to pay.  It 
is not only a result of a proper valuation of the target but the result of the acquirer’s 
financing ability.  Naturally, the larger a target is, the harder it is for an acquirer to 
finance the acquisition. 
Prior literature has shown that Tobin’s Q has an ambiguous effect on CAR, so the 
need to incorporate this factor is debatable.  We do include Tobin’s Q in our model but 
find no significance.  
Whether a deal is cash-financed or not still plays an important role in how investors 
are evaluating the deals.  Table 5 shows that deals that are financed at least partially by 
cash experience far higher CARs, which is consistent with the literature and the 
previous model specification. 
Given that by adding acquirer characteristics we achieve a much higher statistical 
significance, and the base model seems inadequate to give meaningful results, for the 
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next two sections on the M&A market condition and the penny stock consideration we 
will only present the regression results based the model in Table 5.  From here on, we 
will typically refer to it as the “key” model specification. 
Controlling for M&A Market Condition 
The mergers and acquisitions market experiences different cycles.  M&A activity can 
be fueled by the financing capabilities of potential acquirers through the use of debt 
instruments such as high-yield bonds in the 1980s and collateralized debt securities in 
the past decade.  M&A activity can also be fueled by positive outlooks in an 
expansionary economy.  
In this regression model, we control for such effects by adopting a proxy for the M&A 
market condition.  The proxy is defined as the average premium paid to targets in a 
given year.  A premium is defined to be the offer price less the target’s market price 
on the announcement day.  If an acquisition is announced during a boom year, it is 
likely that an acquirer can be overly optimistic and offers a higher premium.  
In the following regression (Table 6), we see that controlling for the market condition 
strengthens the effects of the G-indices, albeit only marginally.  The market condition 
proxy is significant for all three windows, indicating that the target CARs are higher 
during periods of market prosperity. 
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Table 6 
Controlling for M&A Market Condition 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variable is the targets’ 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  2-Day 
Window 
5-Day 
Window 
10-Day 
Window 
G-index 0.00802+ 0.00828** 0.00863** 
  (1.94) (2.02) (2.22) 
Transaction Value -0.01326 -0.01679+ -0.02659* 
  (1.42) (1.81) (3.02) 
Cash-Dummy 0.10844* 0.10884* 0.10155* 
  (4.60) (4.66) (4.58) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.10265* -0.07878** -0.05705 
  (2.65) (2.05) (1.57) 
Target High-Tech 0.11973* 0.07787** 0.05008 
  (3.04) (2.00) (1.35) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.00208 -0.00050 0.00256 
 (0.23) (0.05) (0.30) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.14370 -0.23707** -0.19756** 
 (1.55) (2.58) (2.27) 
Acquirer FCF 0.40680+ 0.20821 0.14842 
 (1.83) (0.95) (0.71) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00095 -0.00609 -0.00483 
 (0.10) (0.65) (0.54) 
Diversifying Dummy 0.03685 0.05670** 0.04876** 
 (1.60) (2.48) (2.25) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.03285** -0.03510** -0.02618+ 
 (2.31) (2.49) (1.95) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.03289** 0.03436** 0.02481+ 
  (2.29) (2.41) (1.84) 
M&A Market Condition 0.00483* 0.00464* 0.00412* 
 (4.42) (4.29) (4.00) 
Intercept -0.04009 0.05798 0.14589 
  (0.36) (0.52) (1.37) 
Number of Obs 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.13335 0.13975 0.14788 
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As for the other control variables, both the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the parameters are consistent with those in Table 5.  We feel that the market condition 
proxy is not necessary since the results for the G-index varies little whether the proxy 
is added although five-day return skips from 10% to 5%. 
Penny Stocks Consideration 
In this section, we study whether these results arose because of price irregularities 
associated with penny stocks.  In our study, we define penny stocks to be targets 
whose stock prices are traded for less than $10.00 on announcement days.  It is a 
general knowledge that penny stocks are typically riskier and their prices fluctuate 
more wildly than other higher-priced stocks.  Penny stocks are also often associated 
with companies on the brink of bankruptcy, suffering from rumors of financial 
difficulties, or they are very small firms traded as OTCs.  And since the price is low, 
the standard deviation associated with the price movement tends to be much larger 
than higher-priced stocks.  That means that the result can potentially skew the effect of 
the G-index. The regression results based on the penny stock dummy and the key 
model specification are as the following: 
Table 7 
Controlling for Penny Stocks 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 and 
2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent variable is 
the targets 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal returns around announcement 
dates.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 1% 
  2-Day 
Window 
5-Day 
Window 
10-Day 
Window 
G-index) 0.00739+ 0.00768+ 0.00803** 
  (1.76) (1.84) (2.03) 
Transaction Value -0.01790+ -0.02209** -0.02721* 
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Table 7 Continued    
  (1.77) (2.20) (2.87) 
Cash-Dummy 0.09736* 0.09725* 0.09152* 
  (4.08) (4.10) (4.08) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.10950* -0.08277** -0.05855 
  (2.78) (2.12) (1.58) 
Target High-Tech 0.10570* 0.06431 0.03484 
  (2.64) (1.62) (0.93) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00353 0.00463 0.00669 
 (0.38) (0.51) (0.77) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.09751 -0.19775** -0.16117+ 
 (1.05) (2.14) (1.84) 
Acquirer FCF 0.40193+ 0.22028 0.13129 
 (1.78) (0.98) (0.62) 
Acquirer Asset 0.00163 -0.00284 -0.00205 
 (0.17) (0.30) (0.23) 
Diversifying Dummy 0.02726+ 0.02842+ 0.01948 
 (1.87) (1.96) (1.42) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.02713+ -0.02909** -0.02071 
 (1.88) (2.02) (1.53) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.01763 0.01678 0.06483 
  (0.42) (0.40) (1.65) 
Penny Dummy 0.15180 0.15345 0.07876 
 (1.56) (1.59) (0.86) 
Intercept 0.22528** 0.32582* 0.35181* 
  (2.25) (3.28) (3.75) 
Number of Obs 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.10167 0.10492 0.12042 
Table 7 shows that, after controlling for penny stocks, the effects of the G-indices are 
consistent and almost identical with those in Table 5 across all windows.  It appears 
that the penny stock dummy itself is not significant and does not affect the results 
obtained from the key model specification.  Like controlling for the market condition 
in Table 6, controlling for the penny stocks in Table 7 does not alter the results.  Given 
the same reason as discussed in the last section, from here on, we will use the Table 5 
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model that includes the acquirer characteristics and 525 observations for the Part II 
analyses. 
Conclusions: Part I 
Based on the base model with 1427 observations and more advanced model with 525 
observations, point estimates in both models are about the same.  The results justify 
our hypothesis that targets acquired by acquirers with more ATPs, a negative proxy 
for the management quality, experience higher announcement returns for 2-day, 5-day 
and 10-day event windows around merger announcement days.  The results extend 
MWX’s argument that acquirers with more ATPs make more value-destroying 
acquisitions.  Based on the data, the results provide evidence for our argument that 
acquirer ATPs create a wealth transfer mechanism between the acquirer shareholders 
and the target shareholders upon merger announcements.  The results are marginally 
significant for the two and five day window and significant at 5% for the ten day 
window9.     
The above results have demonstrated that the regression model based on the deal 
characteristics and acquirer characteristics does the best job at explaining the effects of 
the G-index on target firm value.  Controlling for the M&A market condition and 
penny stocks do not change the explanatory power of the G-index much.  The 
regression results are virtual identical whether we control for M&A market condition 
and penny stocks or not.  Therefore, for Part II, we will only use the “key” model in 
Table 5 as the basis for other analyses.   
                                                           
9
 The asymmetric windows are examined in Part II. 
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Part II: Acquirer Corporate Governance and Net Synergistic Effects 
Theory and Hypotheses 
In Part II, we study the impact of acquirers’ corporate governance on net synergistic 
effects.  Specifically, we examine how the capital market responds to the change in the 
acquirer and target’s combined value with differing values of the acquirer’s G-index.  
As mentioned in Part I, we will use only the “key” model from Table 5, which 
incorporates deal characteristics and acquirer characteristics.  In Part II, we provide 
more detailed discussions on asymmetric windows, acquirer returns and a “breakeven” 
G-index.   
The results in Part I provide support for our hypothesis that targets benefit more upon 
merger announcements from acquirers with poorer corporate governance.  But as 
discussed earlier, there are two potential forces counteracting each other upon merger 
announcements.  First, targets may benefit more from acquirers with poorer corporate 
governance because these acquirers tend to overpay.  Second, targets may also benefit 
from acquirers with good corporate governance due to the eventual transfer of the 
corporate governance measures.  Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) and Bebchuk, 
Cohen and Ferrel (2002, 2004, 2005) find that better governance measures, stock 
ownership of board members, and CEO-Chair separation are significantly and 
positively correlated with better contemporaneous and subsequent operating 
performance.  Therefore, the target’s value can be impacted by the transfer of 
acquirer’s corporate governance measures, though not as directly as the quantifiable 
merger premium paid to the target shareholders.   
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It is a common knowledge that acquirers’ share prices tend to decline upon merger 
announcements.  As discussed before, MWX provides evidence that acquirers with 
higher-ATPs experience more severe price declines than lower-ATP counterparts.  But 
despite their finding, the mergers may still be synergistic after completion.  Suppose 
that due to the hefty price a high-ATP acquirer pays for the target, the acquirer’s share 
price decreases.  Further suppose that this decrease is then perfectly matched by an 
increase in the target’s public valuation upon the merger announcement.  If so, then 
the merger has a zero net impact on the capital market.  However, if the target’s value 
increase outweighs the acquirer’s value decrease, then the difference is positive, 
making the merger a positive impact on the market, and the combined company is 
greater than the sum of the acquirer and target as separate entities.  In short, one plus 
one is greater than two.  In the following, this difference is interpreted as the 
“corporate governance synergy,” which may be positive or negative.   
We then make a logical assumption: an acquisition is only bad when it yields negative 
net present value.  The market cannot foresee the future; therefore, this present value 
is the expectation of future profits based on observable information.  Corporate 
governance is one set of information that can be readily used to evaluate the merger 
and adjust expectations.  An acquirer’s good governance is transferred to the target 
upon merger completion, and a better managed combined entity emerges.  Therefore, 
our main hypothesis is:  If an acquirer has good corporate governance transferred to 
the target, the net effect of a merger should be more positive (or less negative) as 
evaluated by the capital market.   
  
23 
 
Methodology 
The methodology largely follows Part I and specifically the methodology underlying 
Table 5 on the subsample of the mergers with acquirer characteristics.  We acquired 
the data from the Securities Data Corporation’s (SDC) U.S Acquisitions database.  We 
identify 525 acquisitions between January 1990 and December 2007 that meet the 
following criteria: 
1. Public acquirers incorporated in the U.S. 
2. Public targets incorporated in the U.S. 
3. Transaction value of more than $1 million. 
4. The acquirer controls less than 50% of the target’s shares prior to the 
announcement and owns 100% of the target’s shares after the transaction 
5. The acquirer has annual financial statement information available from 
Compustat and stock return data (210 trading days prior to acquisition 
announcements) from the University of Chicago’s Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock Price and Returns file. 
6. The acquirer is included in the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s 
(IRRC) database of antitakeover provisions. 
7. Both the acquirers and targets have beta less than 10 and more than -10. 
8. Has acquirer information based on the model in Table 5, the “key” model. 
The G-index methodology is already discussed in Part I.  In Part II, following 
conventional practices of event studies, we begin by measuring both the acquirer and 
target announcement effects by market model adjusted stock returns around initial 
acquisition announcements.  Acquiring firm and combined firm Cumulative abnormal 
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returns (CARs) are initially analyzed in 2-day, 5-day and 10-day windows as was done 
for target firms in Part I.  We then analyze some asymmetric windows to case light on 
additional issues. 
Calculating Combined Company Returns 
We first obtain the share prices on the announcement days or the closest observable 
share prices (some transactions were announced on non-trading days) before 
announcement days, and the total shares outstanding.  With the stock prices and shares 
outstanding, we calculate the combined values for the acquirers and their targets.  To 
put simply, this combined value is simply the sum of the acquirer and target’s market 
capitalizations.  Note that this value is treating the acquirer and the target as 
independent companies, thus no synergistic measures are included.   
We then obtain the acquirers and targets’ CARs for 2-day, 5-day and 10-day windows 
for both the targets and acquirers.  With this information, we calculate the abnormal 
changes in their stock prices in dollars.  Combined with their shares outstanding, we 
arrive at abnormal value changes in actual dollar amounts.   
With the abnormal value changes in actual dollar amounts, we are able to obtain the 
percentage value changes of the combined entities due to the merger announcements.  
These percentage value changes are the net synergies of mergers.   
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Empirical Results 
The empirical results are based on the key model in Table 5.  The statistical 
summaries of the obtained value changes and the explanatory control variables are as 
the following: 
Table 8: Summary of Percentage Changes of Combined Companies 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
2-Day Combined Value Change 525 -0.01% 6.34% -47.35% 28.42% 
5-Day Combined Value Change 525 0.44% 9.11% -52.73% 39.81% 
10-Day Combined Value Change 525 0.72% 12.66% -52.87% 48.57% 
 
 
Table 9: Summary of Independent and Control Variables based on 525 
Observations 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
G-Index 9.329524 2.668015 1 16 
Cash Dummy 0.5428571 0.498635 0 1 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 2.303886 2.238831 0.8569028 38.41925 
Acquirer Leverage10 0.1524272 0.1296178 0 0.7371824 
Acquirer Free Cash Flows 0.050073 0.0662432 -0.340939611 0.3531846 
Acquirer Assets12 8.431283 1.552842 3.800443 13.90826 
Relative Deal Size13 0.7939625 6.761617 0.0014006 137.2205 
                                                           
10
 Same as part I.  Acquirer leverage is the book value of debt over the market value of total assets.  The 
market value of assets is usually larger than the book value of assets, so the leverage ratio tends to be 
smaller than if the book value of assets is used. 
11
 Acquirer Free Cash Flow is the year’s free cash flow over the acquirer asset, thus it can be negative if 
the acquirer has negative cash flow that year. 
12
 Same as part I.  Acquirer assets is the logged value of assets in $millions.   
13
 Same as part I.  The relative deal size, defined as the logged deal size over the logged acquirer size, 
can be quite large, indicating that the acquirer size is close to 1, resulting in a logged value close to zero.  
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Table 9 Continued 
    Acquirer High Tech Dummy 0.3047619 0.4607455 0 1
Target High Tech Dummy 0.2952381 0.4565848 0 1 
Transaction Value14 6.544817 1.631246 3.003353 11.39827 
Acq High Tech X Relative Deal Size 0.5248381 6.712816 0 137.2205 
The summary table is based on the 525 observations that we use for the following 
analyses.  The mean of the combined changes are close to zero; the 2-day, 5-day and 
10-day combined value changes are -0.01%, 0.44% and 0.72%, respectively.   
Combined Value Changes and Acquirer G-index 
We examine the estimated influence of the G-index and additional control variables on 
the combined value changes.  Target characteristics are not included due to data 
limitations; if included, the number of observations drops to 90, as explained in Part I.  
The regression results based on the key model and symmetric windows are the 
following: 
TABLE 10 
Combined Value Change 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variables are the combined company's 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement dates.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  
2-Day 
Combined 
Value Change 
5-Day 
Combined 
Value Change 
10-Day 
Combined Value 
Change 
G-Index -0.00292* -0.00577* -0.01118* 
 
(5.06) (7.09) (8.37) 
                                                                                                                                                                       
Excluding relative deal size larger than 10 (n=4), the mean becomes 0.35, and the standard deviation is 
0.64 
14
 Same as part I.  Transaction value is the logged transaction value in $millions. 
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Table 10 Continued 
Transaction Value 0.01112* 0.00388** 0.00305 
 
(8.58) (2.12) (1.02) 
Cash Dummy 0.00655* 0.00865** 0.01117+ 
 
(2.63) (2.47) (1.94) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.01090 0.02043** 0.02860+ 
 
(1.54) (2.05) (1.75) 
Target High-Tech -0.01036+ -0.00817 -0.01619 
 
(1.82) (1.02) (1.23) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00155 -0.00045 -0.00236 
 
(0.65) (0.13) (0.43) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.06228* -0.10672* -0.10765* 
 
(5.95) (7.23) (4.45) 
Acquirer FCF -0.17289* -0.20147* -0.11921 
 
(3.76) (3.11) (1.12) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00528* -0.00453** -0.00637** 
 
(4.15) (2.52) (2.17) 
Relative Deal-Size 0.00208 -0.00381 0.00162 
 
(1.26) (1.64) (0.42) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech -0.00178 0.00404+ -0.00079 
 
(1.02) (1.65) (0.20) 
Constant 1.00541* 1.09410* 1.17224* 
 
(75.46) (58.25) (38.06) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.18059 0.19885 0.18958 
Table 10 provides support to our hypothesis that the acquirers’ G-indices are 
negatively correlated with the net synergies of their mergers.  It means that poor 
corporate governance leads to lower combined value changes in mergers.  The results 
show that the capital market tends to be more negatively impacted by merger 
announcements coming from firms with poor corporate governance.   
In Table 10, the cash dummy plays an important role.  A target usually has a more 
positive response when the deal is financed by cash, meaning the target shareholders 
find cash to be more attractive as consideration, as discussed in Part I.  But the 
combined company values are also affected positively when cash is used.  It may be 
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that the shareholders of the acquirers are more comfortable when a merger is financed 
with cash; their stocks’ earnings per share would not be diluted too much when 
additional shares are issued to finance the transaction. 
Here, whether the target industry is high-tech has a minor effect on the combined firm 
value changes.  The variable is only significant for the 2-day window, but this effect 
quickly disappears for the 5-day and 10-day windows.  Whether an acquirer is a high-
tech firm has a positive effect on the synergistic value change, which may be 
attributed to the high-growth strategy the acquirer adopts, as discussed in Part I.  It is 
significant for the 5-day and 10-day windows.  Tobin’s Q continues to have no effects 
as was the case in Part I.   
In Table 10, the acquirer leverage has negative and significant impacts.  This can be 
looked at from two possible angles: First, leverage limits the acquirer’s ability to raise 
merger premiums, as discussed in Part I.  Second, when high-leveraged firms seek to 
expand through mergers, it is probable that the firms would have to increase their 
leverage.  Stockholders may perceive this as a risky weakening of the firm’s financial 
position, leading to a value decline.  
An acquirer’s free cash flow has a negative effect on the synergistic value for the 2-
day and 5-day windows.  The higher an acquirer’s free cash flow, the more room it has 
to overpay.  By definition, free cash flow is the cash that is readily distributable to 
shareholders and debt holders.  Using the cash flows to pay for a merger instead of 
distributing them in the form of dividends or stock buybacks may have a negative 
signaling effect.  Since free cash flows are the cash flows less other necessary capital 
expenditures for organic growth, a company that has high free cash flows tends to be 
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in an industry where growth prospects are more limited.  Given that, the manager of a 
firm may resort to acquiring the competitors as a source of growth.  However, 
shareholders may prefer dividend payouts to money spent on mergers.   
We have now examined the effects of the G-index on target value and the combined 
value.  Next, we look at synergies in more detail in the following sections, but first we 
look at the other component of the combined company value, the acquirer value.  The 
combined value is particularly important as the change indicates the net impacts of 
mergers themselves.  This goes beyond the mere zero-sum- game of shareholders of 
the acquirers and targets.  We here are trying to gauge the net impacts of the mergers 
as calculated by the market model.  The next section will start by discussing the G-
index again and move on to discuss the methodology we use in calculating the net 
impacts. 
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The G-Index and Acquirer Returns 
We examine the effects of the G-index on acquirer announcement returns in Table 11.  
The results here are consistent with those found by MWX.  The negative impacts of 
high-G values are expected based on Table 10 (the combined values) because 
acquiring firms are usually larger than their targets.  Therefore, greater G-index means 
lower acquirer CARs in Table 11, inferring from Table 10.  The value of using the 10-
day window is apparent since the coefficient is doubled that for the 5-day window, 
which is in turn triple the 2-day window. 
TABLE 11 
Acquirer Returns & G-index 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variables are the acquirer’s 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  
2-Day Acquirer 
CAR 
5-Day Acquirer 
CAR 
10-Day Acquirer 
CAR 
G-index -0.00229* -0.00689* -0.01352* 
(4.02) (7.93) (7.88) 
Transaction Value 0.01179* 0.00670* 0.00290 
(9.03) (3.36) (0.74) 
Cash Dummy 0.00619** 0.01887* 0.03420* 
(2.38) (4.75) (4.36) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.00431 0.02111+ 0.02902 
(0.59) (1.90) (1.32) 
Target High-Tech -0.01531** -0.01189 -0.02629 
(2.54) (1.29) (1.44) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00010 -0.00066 -0.00178 
(0.04) (0.17) (0.24) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.08664* -0.11423* -0.16264* 
(7.58) (6.54) (4.72) 
Acquirer FCF -0.21211* -0.16729** -0.09113 
(4.59) (2.37) (0.65) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00530* -0.00521** -0.00403 
(4.02) (2.58) (1.01) 
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Table 11 Continued 
Relative Deal-Size 0.01586* 0.00574 0.01320+ 
(6.21) (1.47) (1.71) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.00062 0.00046 0.00280+ 
(1.11) (0.53) (1.67) 
Constant -0.00248 0.07775* 0.15215* 
(0.18) (3.74) (3.70) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.25963 0.18802 0.19537 
Although cash is considered a more costly source of funding in an acquisition, in our 
data cash has positive effects on acquirer returns.  Investment banks usually conduct 
an accretion/ dilution analysis for an acquirer to determine whether its earnings per 
share is diluted after accounting for the new shares that are to be issued to finance the 
acquisition.  Investors may respond negatively to an acquisition that may severely 
dilute their earnings per share since the capital market usually responds to dilutions 
negatively.  Financing a deal using cash limits such negative price responses, which 
may be the reason why the cash dummy has positive impacts on acquirer returns. 
Combined Company Return with Asymmetric Windows 
In this section, we examine the combined returns in asymmetric windows.  The reason 
to look at the asymmetric windows is because the effects of the G-index are 
considerably different across the three event windows.  It is conceivable that larger 
windows have greater effects because the market may have a lag in reaction after the 
announcement date, but it is also conceivable that the difference is attributed to a 
market “run-up” before the announcement date.  In order to gain perspective as to 
whether the results are being driven by behavior after the announcement or by run-up 
before the announcement, we need to examine asymmetric windows. 
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Table 12 is a simple table demonstrating the G-index’s effects in the asymmetric 
windows for the synergy model.  The detailed regressions are presented in Table 13-
15 below: 
Table 12: Statistical Significance of G-
Index for Asymmetric Windows 
minus2_plus2 minu2_plus5 minus2_plus10 
-0.00292* -0.00353* -0.00458* 
minus5_plus_2 minus5_plus5 minus5_plus10 
-0.00574* -0.00577* -0.00738* 
minus10_plus2 minus10_plus5 minus10_plus10 
-0.01111* -0.01166* -0.01118* 
The diagonal elements of Table 12 replicate the values from Table 10, and they are 
also in Tables 13-15.  Starting in the first row, results show slightly more negative 
effects as the days 3-5 are added and again slightly more if the days 6-10 are added.  A 
similar pattern emerges for the second row as well.  The third row, however, yields 
almost the same result for the windows [-10, +2] and [-10, +5] or [-10, +10].  This 
suggests that much of the value changes come in the time frame [-10, -5], indicating a 
run up effect.  This suggests either insider trading, rumors or information leakage prior 
to the announcement date. 
If the capital market is highly efficient, one expects the G-index within [-2, +2] (the 
“2-day” window) days to have the strongest impact from the explanatory variables on 
the combined returns.  The effects should be stronger because of less noise.  However, 
as Table 12 also indicates, [-10, +10] has the strongest impacts. 
Table 13 includes windows that are between [-2, +2], [-2, +5] and [-2, +10] days 
around the announcement days.  Table 14 includes windows that are between [-5, +2], 
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[-5, +5] and [-5, +10] days.  Table 15 includes windows that are between [-10, +2], [-
10, +5] and [-10, +10] days.   
 
Table 13 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows (1) 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) 
between 1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision 
database. The dependent variables are the combined company's cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement dates for symmetric and asymmetric windows. Absolute 
value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
1% 
  minus2_plus2 minu2_plus5 minus2_plus10 
G-Index -0.00292* -0.00353* -0.00458* 
 
(5.06) (5.49) (4.66) 
Transaction Value 0.01112* 0.00659* 0.00979* 
 
(8.58) (4.58) (4.44) 
Cash Dummy 0.00655* 0.00392 0.01001** 
 
(2.63) (1.42) (2.36) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.01090 0.01324+ 0.01037 
 
(1.54) (1.69) (0.86) 
Target High-Tech -0.01036+ -0.00169 0.01544 
 
(1.82) (0.27) (1.59) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00155 -0.00370 -0.00583 
 
(0.65) (1.40) (1.44) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.06228* -0.11565* -0.11458* 
 
(5.95) (9.95) (6.43) 
Acquirer FCF -0.17289* -0.16756* -0.13493+ 
 
(3.76) (3.28) (1.73) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00528* -0.00433* -0.00552** 
 
(4.15) (3.06) (2.55) 
Relative Deal-Size 0.00208 -0.00245 -0.00239 
 
(1.26) (1.34) (0.85) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech -0.00178 0.00250 0.00261 
 
(1.02) (1.30) (0.88) 
Constant 1.00541* 1.05968* 1.05724* 
 
(75.46) (71.62) (46.62) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.18059 0.30602 0.19251 
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Table 14 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows (2) 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) 
between 1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision 
database. The dependent variables are the combined company's cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement dates for symmetric and asymmetric windows. Absolute 
value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 
1% 
  minus5_plus_2 minus5_plus5 minus5_plus10 
G-Index -0.00574* -0.00577* -0.00738* 
 
(7.48) (7.09) (6.28) 
Transaction Value 0.00968* 0.00388** 0.00808* 
 
(5.62) (2.12) (3.06) 
Cash Dummy 0.01237* 0.00865** 0.01603* 
 
(3.74) (2.47) (3.16) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.01871** 0.02043** 0.01801 
 
(1.99) (2.05) (1.25) 
Target High-Tech -0.01648** -0.00817 0.00915 
 
(2.18) (1.02) (0.79) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00420 -0.00045 -0.00320 
 
(1.33) (0.13) (0.66) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.05800* -0.10672* -0.10931* 
 
(4.17) (7.23) (5.13) 
Acquirer FCF -0.21289* -0.20147* -0.17133+ 
 
(3.49) (3.11) (1.83) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00680* -0.00453** -0.00698* 
 
(4.03) (2.52) (2.69) 
Relative Deal-Size 0.00098 -0.00381 -0.00363 
 
(0.44) (1.64) (1.08) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech -0.00002 0.00404+ 0.00450 
 
(0.01) (1.65) (1.27) 
Constant 1.05018* 1.09410* 1.10306* 
 
(59.35) (58.25) (40.68) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.15041 0.19885 0.13475 
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 Table 15 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows (3) 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 
1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The 
dependent variable is the combined company's cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates for symmetric and asymmetric windows. Absolute value of t statistics 
in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  minus10_plus2 minus10_plus5 minus10_plus10 
G-Index -0.01111* -0.01166* -0.01118* 
 
(10.82) (10.34) (8.37) 
Transaction Value 0.00464** 0.00012 0.00305 
 
(2.01) (0.05) (1.02) 
Cash Dummy 0.00793+ 0.00536 0.01117+ 
 
(1.79) (1.10) (1.94) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.03103** 0.03337** 0.02860+ 
 
(2.47) (2.42) (1.75) 
Target High-Tech -0.04367* -0.03513* -0.01619 
 
(4.31) (3.16) (1.23) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00305 -0.00248 -0.00236 
 
(0.72) (0.54) (0.43) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.07996* -0.13346* -0.10765* 
 
(4.30) (6.53) (4.45) 
Acquirer FCF -0.18521** -0.18177** -0.11921 
 
(2.27) (2.03) (1.12) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00726* -0.00644* -0.00637** 
 
(3.21) (2.59) (2.17) 
Relative Deal-Size 0.00748** 0.00265 0.00162 
 
(2.54) (0.82) (0.42) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech -0.00526+ -0.00071 -0.00079 
 
(1.71) (0.21) (0.20) 
Constant 1.15330* 1.20907* 1.17224* 
 
(48.71) (46.47) (38.06) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.26457 0.30646 0.18958 
Now we have examined the effects of the G-index in the asymmetric windows and 
concluded that most effects are driven by stock run-ups.  In the next section, we will 
use the three windows [-10, +2], [-10, +5] and [-10, +10] to see whether there exists a 
“breakeven” G-index under which the combined value is positive. 
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Breakeven G-index  
In this section, we examine the “breakeven” G-index, meaning the number of ATPs, 
under which the expected value of the combined returns of the companies are positive.  
Using the key model specification, we set the combined change in these [-10. +2], [-10, 
+5] and [-10, +10] windows equal to zero to solve for the critical G-indices based on 
the regression results for the three windows.  The following are the critical G-indices 
in the three windows: 
  minus10_plus2 minus10_plus5 minus10_plus10 
Breakeven G 13.24 13.02 13.52 
Obs with G-index < 13 487 487 487 
Obs with returns > 0 465 449 488 
These three values are interpreted as “the critical point under which the value changes 
tend to be positive based on the model specification.”  For the following table, we 
drop the observations with G-indices larger than 13.  The breakeven G-indices are 
around 13 for the three windows, higher than the mean G-index in the sample 
(mean=9).  Given that the maximum G-index in the 525 observations is 16, it indicates 
that the G-index has to be pretty high for it to bring the combined values to become 
negative.  In fact, if the positive values for returns are 487 observations, only 7% of 
the sample has negative returns seemingly induced by high values of the G-index.  
Table 16 is the regression result for the observations with G-indices less than the 
critical G-index value for the three windows.  
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Table 16 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows under 
Breakeven G-Index 
The sample consists of 487 observations for G-index<13 out of 525 observations from the 
previous regression tables.  The dependent variables are the combined company's cumulative 
abnormal returns around announcement dates for symmetric and asymmetric windows. 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 1% 
  minus10_plus2 minus10_plus5 minus10_plus10 
Table 16 continued 
G-Index -0.01242* -0.01266* -0.01205* 
 
(10.83) (9.98) (7.81) 
Transaction Value 0.00697* 0.00171 0.00368 
 
(2.95) (0.65) (1.16) 
Cash Dummy 0.00725 0.00305 0.00958 
 
(1.57) (0.60) (1.55) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.01443 0.01804 0.01905 
 
(1.08) (1.22) (1.06) 
Target High-Tech -0.03963* -0.03143* -0.01395 
 
(3.86) (2.77) (1.01) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00682 0.00061 -0.00108 
 
(1.60) (0.13) (0.19) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.07775* -0.12637* -0.09867* 
 
(4.07) (5.98) (3.84) 
Acquirer FCF -0.25829* -0.22494** -0.11654 
 
(3.06) (2.41) (1.03) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00823* -0.00728* -0.00678** 
 
(3.64) (2.91) (2.23) 
Relative Deal-Size 0.01287** 0.00363 -0.00333 
 
(2.51) (0.64) (0.48) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech -0.01036** -0.00143 0.00429 
 
(1.99) (0.25) (0.61) 
Constant 1.15321* 1.21090* 1.17677* 
 
(48.65) (46.16) (36.93) 
Observations 487 487 487 
R-squared 0.29038 0.31666 0.18501 
We can see that the coefficients for the G-indices are stronger than before.  Also, the 
coefficients for the three windows are highly similar, meaning that the additional 
information between [+3, +10] does not really affect the information structure with 
respect to the influence of the G-index.   
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Based on the above two sections, we see that most effects of acquirer corporate 
governance measures start days before the merger announcements.  It is interesting to 
note that by including larger windows for event studies, one may strengthen the 
impacts of explanatory control variables.  Most previous event studies on corporate 
governance include only the [-2, +2] windows, but the capital market may have begun 
responding to information leakage and rumors days before formal event 
announcements. 
Conclusions: Part II 
Based on the above results, we show that high-ATP acquirers engage in mergers that 
are not only destructive to their own firm values but on average result in lower net 
synergies.  Moreover, the impact has to do with the fraction of sample with dependent 
variable negative or with G-index less than 13 based on our sample.  Additionally, we 
confirm in Table 9 the results in MWX by showing that high-ATP acquirers engage in 
value-destroying acquisitions, or, to put it more mildly, an acquirer’s higher G-index is 
negatively correlated to its stock price and causes a more severe decline in the stock 
price upon a merger announcement. 
In asymmetric windows, the impact of the G-index on the combined company’s value 
change is more significant when more days are included prior to announcement days, 
indicating that the “run-up” effects are more pronounced than the public 
announcement effects.  Although slightly outside the scope of this paper, it would be 
interesting to see whether such run-ups are caused by information leakage or insider 
trading such that an acquirer’s insider took actions to sell or buy stocks prior to the 
merger announcement based on its management quality (represented by the G-index).  
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In addition, based on our study of asymmetric windows, smaller windows tend to have 
weaker results, indicating that the capital market does not absorb the information in 
the days immediately around the announcement date, but rather the effects appear to 
be mostly run-up effects, with the stock market anticipating the announcement.  Lastly, 
we calculate the breakeven G-index under which the net synergistic effects tend to be 
positive based on the three asymmetric windows.  We find that the information after 
the announcement day does not affect the breakeven G-index. 
Conclusions from This Study 
Results from Part I and Part II are have provided support for our hypothesis that 
targets acquired by acquirers with more ATPs experience higher merger 
announcement returns.  We also confirm MWX’s argument in Part II such that 
acquirer with many ATPs experience greater decline in its stock price upon a merger 
announcement, and the results support our claim that acquirer ATPs create a wealth 
transfer mechanism between the acquirer shareholders and the target shareholders 
upon merger announcements.  For the net synergistic effects, based on the above 
results, very high-ATP acquirers, roughly top 7 percent of in G-index values, engage 
in mergers that are not only destructive to their own firm values but on average result 
in lower net synergies.  The broad, negative implications of a firm having many ATPs 
should not be ignored, and the market for corporate control should be allowed to 
function properly to protect shareholders.   
 
 
  
40 
 
Chapter 2 
MARKET SHARES AND NET INTEREST MARGINS IN THE TAIWANESE 
BANKING INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
In Asia, the market structures of the banking industries in many newly industrialized 
countries have gone through significant changes in the past decade due to the Asian 
financial crisis, and rapid consolidation and high net interest margins (NIMs) have 
been the special characteristics for the financial markets in developing countries15.  
Among other developing nations, the Taiwanese banking industry is special for its 
consistent low market concentration and NIMs.   
A competitive price is beneficial to consumers, but an overly-competitive banking 
industry may be harmful to a nation’s economic development in the long run.  In 
Taiwan, the banking industry is such a case where a fiercely competitive banking 
industry, combined with the previous administration’s refusal to open up the border 
toward the Chinese government, resulted in small and unprofitable banks that are 
unable to compete internationally and service Taiwanese corporation’s operations 
overseas.  The increase in the number of competing commercial and retail banks was 
the result of the financial liberalization in 1991.  In this study, we examine the gradual 
                                                           
15
 Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga’s (2000) empirical study finds that, for countries with underdeveloped 
financial systems, a move toward a more developed financial system reduces bank margins and 
profitability.  More specifically, in developing countries, both the banks and stock markets are less 
developed, and the greater the development of a country’s banks, the harsher is the competitive 
environment, the greater is the efficiency, and the lower are the bank margins and profits.     
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erosion of the NIMs of Taiwanese banks and their relationships with different market 
shares.  
For this study, we obtain access to a comprehensive Taiwanese banking dataset.  This 
dataset has never used in published academic papers studying the Asian banking 
industries.  Because the time span of the database traces back to the origin of the 
financial liberalization in Taiwan in 1991, by conducting panel regression analysis, we 
are able to confirm some predictions regarding bank profitability and behavior.  In 
addition, the Taiwanese banking industry serves as a good example for this type of 
study because its services have been largely unchanged for the previous two decades, 
and the only drastic changes were the rapid growth in the number of banks in the 
1990s and the shift of focus from collateralized lending to credit lending after 200116.  
Therefore, there is little noise in analyzing the relationship between NIMs and banks’ 
market shares.   
In what follows we examine some determinates of the NIMs of banks in Taiwan (the 
lending rate net of the borrowing rate).  We will look at these margins as affected by 
concepts like “market power.”  In this regard it is important to distinguish between 
types of market power and to also understand the limitations of looking solely at NIMs. 
Market power, as used in the literature, often carries a pejorative connotation, e.g., the 
implication of collusion or coordination between sellers.  This should not be the case 
in all instances.  Patents, for example, are a temporary granting of monopoly power (or 
                                                           
16
 This claim is discussed later in the paper. 
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market power) to encourage invention and technological progress.  The market power 
here is generally for a single firm and considered to be a social good. 
The tension between these two interpretations can be traced primarily to Bain (1951) 
and Demsetz (1973).  Bain found a correlation between industry concentration and 
firm profits, which he interpreted as meaning that industries with higher concentration 
had higher profits due to collusion (tacit or explicit), supporting the pejorative 
interpretation of the term. 
Demestz points out that, just as with patents, any innovations which lead to either 
superior technologies (low production costs) or superior products can lead to some 
firms enjoying the economics rents from their insights through individual firm (not 
collective) market power.  His insight was that this could lead to a firm developing a 
higher market share and higher profits.  The result could then be that industry 
concentration rises and industry profits rise, the correlation between concentration and 
profits could be due to market power, but unilateral market power rewarding 
successful entrepreneurial competition, a desired outcome just as with the patent 
system.17 
What is the likely explanation for the concentration - profits relationships found in the 
literature, collective market power or unilateral market power?  Scherer and Ross 
(1990) state that this is the “main question” in empirical industrial organization in the 
latter part of the twentieth century.  Their conclusion is that the Demsetz hypothesis 
                                                           
17
 Dixit (1986) shows that with heterogeneous goods outcomes are highly dependent upon demand 
structures.  So, for example, if Porsche comes out with a superior product it will gain higher profits and 
its very small share will increase, possibly eroding industry concentration.  We ignore such effects. 
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“wins” the day with them saying that market “power appears to be wielded not 
collectively...”  Although Jakubson, Jeong, Kim and Masson (2009) have a working 
paper which questions this (for Korean data) we will not pursue the issue in detail. 
The reason for the importance of this debate to our work has to do with the distinction 
between market share and market concentration.  Following Demsetz’s work one 
might interpret a market share - firm profit correlation as “good” unilateral market 
power.  An industry market concentration - industry profits correlation, however, can 
be due to either Bain’s collusive hypothesis or Demsetz’s superior firm hypothesis.  
So, in modeling NIMs, as functions of market shares or functions of market 
concentration, we have to be careful about interpretation of results.  So correlations 
may be interesting, yet not determinative of a particular interpretation of results. 
The second issue of importance is a certain limitation of looking at NIMs alone.  
Suppose one had identical firms and perfect competition.  Suppose that it takes a 
dollar of deposits to make a dollar of loans.  Further suppose that it costs $c to convert 
a dollar of deposits to a dollar of loans.  Then one would expect something like 
rloans = rdeposits + c where the NIM ≡ rloans - rdeposits.  Collective behavior could raise the 
NIM by creating rloans > rdeposits + c.  Alternative, one firm facing a lower c than its 
rivals might make profits while its rivals are breaking even.   
To distinguish types of behavior, such as the behaviors implied by Bain or Demsetz's 
hypotheses one would need information not only on interest rates, but also on firm 
marginal costs.  Without this information this study focuses on NIMs to see if shares, 
concentration or other factors explain these margins. 
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In this paper, we investigate how NIMs are affected by different types of market 
shares, macroeconomic variables and financial market structures, controlling for 
several firm-specific variables such as bank financial structures and lending practices.  
Then we will move on to different types of market concentration to examine the 
relationship between NIMs and market concentration.  
Banking Industry Literature Review 
Recent research, as surveyed by Levine (1997), shows that the efficiency of financial 
intermediaries can affect economic growth.  Specifically, banks affect the net returns 
on savings and determine the required returns on investments.  In order to achieve 
efficiency and service corporations, banks have to be sufficiently large to achieve the 
economies of scales which reduce operating costs.  Bank consolidation waves in Hong 
Kong, Korea and Japan have produced some of the largest and competitive financial 
institutions in the world. 
In general, financial institutions may benefit from consolidation for positive reasons.  
First, consolidation may create economies of scale, economies of scope and 
managerial efficiencies which may reduce costs.  Second, financial institutions can 
expand and enter into other segments through consolidation, potentially lowering 
operating risks by further diversification.  Third, consolidation may increase surviving 
banks’ market power and induce collusion. 
Berger and Hannan (1989) and Hannan (1991) study how U.S. banks in more 
concentrated local markets charge higher rates on corporate loans and pay lower rates 
on retail deposits, resulting in higher NIMs. Many papers have focused on the impacts 
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of concentration on the degree of competition in the banking sector and bank 
profitability.  Demiguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) analyzed the effects of 
concentration and bank regulation on U.S. bank spreads.   
As for NIMs, Hanson and Rocha (1986) summarize the role that implicit and explicit 
taxes play in raising spreads and discuss some of the determinants of bank costs and 
profits, such as inflation, scale economies and market structure.  The authors use 
aggregate interest data for 29 countries between 1975 and 1983; they find a positive 
correlation between NIMs and inflation.   
Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997) use 1993 data from 19 industrial countries to study the 
impacts of banking power on bank returns on equity controlling for several bank and 
market characteristics.  They find that variations in bank power, concentration, and the 
existence of explicit deposit insurance do not significantly affect the return on bank 
equity.  However, their study does not control for many important variables that affect 
the base lending rates.  
Kunt and Huizinga (1999) use bank-level data of 80 countries from 1988 to 1995 to 
show that differences in NIMs and bank profitability reflect a variety of determinants: 
bank characteristics, macroeconomic conditions, explicit and implicit bank taxation, 
deposit insurance regulation, overall financial structure and underlying legal and 
institutional indicators.  They find that a larger ratio of bank assets to gross domestic 
product and a lower market concentration ratio lead to lower margins and profits, 
controlling for differences in bank activity, leverage and the macroeconomic 
environment.     
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Salas and Saurina (2002) provide empirical evidence on the effects of 
regulatory changes on the market power of Spanish banks.  They study how 
banks responded to regulatory changes in terms of risk-taking behavior as the 
result of increased competition and reduced economic profits. In addition, the 
study shows that industry liberalization measures have increased competition 
and eroded banks’ market power.  They also find that banks with lower charter 
values tend to have lower equity-assets ratios, indicating lower solvency, and 
they experience higher risk.   
Several papers examine the effects of bank M&As on prices.  Mergers or 
consolidations increase market concentration, which increase banks’ market power (by 
collusion, tacit or explicit) and theoretically create more unfavorable prices for 
customers on deposits and loans.  But alternatively, banks may also reach better 
economies of scale and efficiency savings that may be passed on to customers.  Prager 
and Hannan (1998) find that M&As increased local concentration in U.S. banking 
markets and had unfavorable price effects.  Others such as Akhavein, Berger and 
Humphrey (1997) find mixed or insignificant effects of M&As’ effects on prices in the 
U.S.  Sapienza (2002) also finds mixed results for the Italian banking industry.  
Panetta and Focarelli (2003) explain that, based on their empirical research on the 
Italian banking sector, short-run effects of M&As may have short-run effects on prices 
that are unfavorable to customers, but that the long-run effects were favorable due to 
efficiency gains.  In short, their logic is that the market power effects dominate in the 
short-run and the efficiency effects dominate in the long term. 
Demiguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004) examine the impact of bank regulations, 
concentration and national institutions on bank NIMs using data on 1400 banks across 
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72 countries.  They control for bank-specific characteristics and macroeconomic 
factors.  The results show that tighter regulations on bank entry, restrictions on bank 
activities and regulations that limit the freedom of bankers to conduct their business all 
boost NIMs.  However, we feel that comparing the NIMs across different countries 
without controlling for important economic variables such as the base lending rate for 
banks or the discount rate set by the central bank may result in ambiguity.  They find a 
weak positive relationship between bank margins and concentration, but the 
relationship becomes insignificant when controlling for institutional development.   
In this literature review we find several factors influencing banking competition and 
NIMs.  From our review of the literature, it appears to us that there are some gaps 
which should be explored.  For example, no papers have considered the basic sources 
of income and lending practices - some banks may depend on account service fees as 
an important source of revenue.  Such banks, if large, may charge lower lending rates 
because they are volume-based, or they may charge lower interest rates because they 
are trying to expand.   
In terms of actual lending practices, collateralized lending is also different from credit 
lending.  If a bank focuses on the former type of lending, such that the borrowers have 
assets that can be seized and liquidated in the event of default, then banks can afford to 
charge lower lending rates.   This type of lending usually consists largely of 
institutional lending or mortgages.  As for credit lending, because the default 
possibility is based on a firm or a person’s credit history, a bank usually charges 
higher lending rates to compensate for the additional risk.  If a bank focuses more on 
credit lending than on collateralized lending, it will have higher average lending rates, 
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resulting in higher NIMs, holding all else equal.  To the author’s knowledge, no paper 
has taken this factor into account when conducting industry analysis.   
The Taiwanese Banking Industry 
Before 1989, most Taiwanese banks were state-owned.  In 1989, the Lee 
administration passed and instituted a new banking law, essentially opening up the 
Taiwanese banking industry to the establishment of new privately-owned banks.  The 
policy officially came into effect in 1991 and drastically lowered the barriers to entry 
in the banking industry.  As soon as the deregulation went underway, 13 new banks 
were created.  Before 1991 there were only twelve banks.  In 1991, the entry of 13 
new banks doubled the number of banks which continued to shoot up until there were 
52 banks in 2002 after which consolidation and exit saw a decline to 37 banks in 2008. 
Due to the competitive banking landscape, bank profits have been decreasing since the 
1990s. The continuous, decades-long decline of the NIMs has posed a serious 
challenge.  Interest earned from banking loans to consumers and firms is still the 
biggest income source for banks and the decrease in NIMs directly affects banks’ 
returns on equity (ROE).  Based on the data provided by the Financial Supervisory 
Commission and the Central Bank in Taiwan, in 1993 the seven state-owned major 
banks had an average ROE of 22.90% and the domestic non-state-own average was 
12.46%.   In 2000, the domestic average declined to 6.19% in 2000, -6.93% in 2002, 
10.30% in 2004 and 1.95% in 2006.   
Recognizing the over-banking problem, the Taiwanese government began a series of 
actions to meet these challenges.  One law that was passed was the Financial Holding 
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Company Act.  After the passage of the Financial Holding Company Act in 2001, 
fourteen financial holding companies were established, owning banks, insurers or 
securities firms.  The government purposefully allowed the creation of such powerful 
financial conglomerates in hopes of seeing accelerated consolidation in the banking 
industry.  However, the passage of the act did not facilitate the banking industry 
consolidation to an ideal level.  After eight years, there are still 37 banks in Taiwan as 
of 2009, far too many when compared with other Asian countries such as Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Japan and South Korea.  In these countries, the total assets market share of 
the three largest banks was 63% in South Korea, 83% in Hong Kong, 72% in 
Singapore, 68% in Australia, but only 16% in Taiwan (Hwang and Wu, 2007)18.  
Moreover, the state-owned banks continued to hold the majority market shares in 
Taiwan.  These banks lack international competitiveness in terms of service qualities 
and product offerings19 , and a privatization of these state-owned banks would be 
necessary for these banks to get stronger market positions and increase the 
competitiveness in both domestic and international markets.  
At the beginning of the millennium, pressured by the low profitability, banks began to 
focus on credit lending and offer innovative products.  Products like the cash cards 
(many stores do not allow credit-card purchases in Taiwan), credit cards and 
collateralized debt obligations became popular.  Because the lending amount is 
relatively small for each consumer, banks could charge higher lending rates.   
                                                           
18
 Of these countries only Hong Kong and Singapore are smaller than Taiwan, but both have stronger 
financial institutions than those in Taiwan. 
19
 Indicated by the ranking of the World Economic Forum (WEF) and the Global Competition Index 
(GCI) in 2007. 
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Methodology 
Data 
Two databases owned by the National Taiwan University are used.  One database 
includes the monthly data on the operational information such as bank lending rates, 
bank deposit rates, the deposit market shares, lending, depositing amounts and etc.  
The other database extracts the information from banks’ quarterly filings; it has the 
basic performance measures, profitability and cost structure on a quarterly basis.  The 
frequencies of these two databases are different such that the data extracted from the 
quarterly reports have only four observations for a bank per year, whereas the other 
database has twelve observations.   If only quarterly data is used, some monthly data 
would be sacrificed.  To utilize all available information, we replace the missing 
values based on the information available at the last observation.  Aside from the 
above adjustments, there are no other modifications done to the datasets. 
Over 400 variables are identified in the combined dataset, and the most important ones 
are chosen to construct the regression model.  Moreover, aside from the high 
frequency and long length of data, this study is also unique in that it includes many 
control variables.  The control variables include a comprehensive set of bank 
characteristics such as size, leverage and lending practices, macroeconomic indicators 
and financial market structure.  As discussed earlier, the Taiwanese financial industry 
was largely stale before 1991.  In this study, we use observations between 1991 and 
2009 and end up with 5081 observations in total.   
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Model 
This paper uses panel data regression with fixed effects to analyze the impacts of 
various types of market shares on bank NIMs.  The pricing power is conventionally 
defined as the net interest margin, also called the bank spread.  This study controls for 
a host of bank characteristics and macroeconomic variables by estimating regressions 
of the following form (base model):  

,  α  αDebt to Assets Ratio i,t  +  a2  NPL Percentage i,t  
+ a3 Service to Interest Income Ratio i,t
 
    
+ a4 Administrative Cost Percentage i,t  
+ a5 Discount Rate t + a6 Base Lending Rate t + a7 Market Share i,t  
+ a8   ,                 (1), 
where i is the bank id, t refers to the time period considered in monthly frequency.  
Equation (1) is motivated by the dealership model of bank spreads developed by Ho 
and Saunders (1981), extended by Allen (1988), Angbazo (1997) and others, and the 
firm theoretical framework developed by Zarruck (1989) and Wong (1997).  The two 
models predict how operating costs, regulatory costs, credit risks and market structure 
can affect interest spreads.  Their models are modified in this paper, and we use ex 
ante NIMs whereas they use ex post NIMs20. 
The NIM is the difference between the weighted-average lending rate of the month, 
which is defined as the ex ante weighted-average contractual lending rates and 
                                                           
20
 Ex ante NIM is the pre-determined, contractual net interest margins, and ex post NIM is the 
difference between the interest payment actually received and the deposit interest paid out by the bank. 
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weighted-average lending rate on new loans, and the average deposit rate of the month, 
which is defined as the ex ante weighted-average contractual deposit rates and 
weighted-average lending rate on new deposits.     
The debt-to-asset ratio is the ratio of total debt (bank liabilities) to total assets.  Buser, 
Chen and Kane (1981) examine the theoretical relationship between bank profitability 
and bank capitalization.  Banks that have high levels of liabilities compared with their 
equity would have higher incentives to get better-capitalized and engage in more 
prudent lending behavior, causing lower NIMs.  In the 1990s, Berger (1995b) shows 
that U.S. banks have a positive relationship between bank profitability and 
capitalization.  Banks that are well-capitalized also face lower expected bankruptcy 
costs for themselves and their customers, and they are able to engage in more 
profitable (riskier) lending practices.    
The administrative cost refers to the ratio of administrative expenses to average assets.  
Banks which incur higher administrative costs per unit of business may have higher 
marginal costs of lending and in equilibrium some or all of the difference in marginal 
costs may be passed on in terms of greater NIMs. 
The NPL percentage is the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans.  Non-
performing loans include the preexisting and current NPLs.  NPLs typically only stay 
on a bank’s balance sheet for a couple years, and then are written down at the 
discretion of bank managers or partially recovered by collection agencies.  This 
variable captures the credit risk imbedded in the preexisting bank portfolio, which may 
likely affect the bank’s attitude toward future risks and types of customers.  This 
variable is often included in the literature, but it is especially important since we are 
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using ex ante NIMs.  The NPL in this case captures the differing portfolio risks.  
Specifically, banks will charge higher rates of interest on riskier loans so banks with 
riskier loans and facing similarly riskier loans in the future will have higher average 
NIMs. 
The discount rate is the government’s marginal lending rate to banks, and it is set by 
the central bank.  It is a fixed rate for banks to borrow money from the central bank.  It 
is also called the interest rate for “discount window lending.”  The discount rate has 
not been studied much in the literature on bank spreads, but it represents a cost for the 
banks to borrow money from the central bank.  Banks may be incentivized to pursue 
more deposits if liquidity is needed by paying more for them in the form of higher 
deposit interest rates, which may have a negative impact on NIMs.  In equilibrium a 
bank may want to hold these safer assets because of having higher risk loans and 
wanting to balance those in its portfolio.  
The base lending rate is targeted by the central bank. This interest rate is also known 
as the “federal funds rate,” and it is the shot-term rate at which the banks lend to each 
other.  It is also known as the minimum lending rate and serves as the basis for debtors 
to refinance loans, meaning that a higher base lending rate should have a positive 
relationship with the NIMs.   
The liquid ratio is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.  Liquid assets 
include cash and deposit balances in other banks, including reserve requirements at the 
central bank.  A high liquidity ratio, whether self-imposed or required by regulatory 
authority, inflicts a cost on banks since they have liquid assets on their balance sheets 
that can be reallocated to less-liquid but higher-return assets.  
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Four different kinds of market shares are used.  There are the average monthly deposit 
market share, the bank branch market share (out of total branches in the country), 
credit lending market share and collateralized lending market share.  The first two are 
concerned with the absolute bank size in the industry, and the latter two address the 
bank lending practices.  The average monthly deposit market share is the market share 
of the total deposits a bank has in the financial market.  Bank branch market share is 
self-explanatory, though not often used in the literature.  The bank branch market 
share is important in Taiwan since online banking is not yet prevalent in Taiwan, and 
most customers have to go to a physical location to receive banking services.  Credit 
lending and collateralized lending market shares are the market shares of how much 
credit loans and collateralized loans a bank makes in a month.  To the author’s 
knowledge, these two explanatory variables have never been used in literature.   
Net Interest Margin and Profitability 
This study uses ex-ante interest spreads.  The ex-ante spread is the difference between 
the contractual rates charged on loans and rates paid on deposits.  It is appropriate in 
our context to use the ex-ante NIMs because this study examines the pricing power of 
banks.  In the literature, researchers usually use ex-post NIMs, which is the spread 
between banks’ actual interest revenue and their actual interest expense.  The reason is 
that ex-ante spreads are generally only available at the aggregate industry level and are 
put together from a variety of sources.  In this study, we are able to obtain historical 
ex-ante data at the firm level.   
Again, most papers use ex-post spreads because the ex-ante spreads, determined by 
contractual agreements, are not available.  The ex-post spread is the difference 
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between the implicit average interest charged on loans and the implicit average 
interest paid on deposits.  The spread is calculated by taking the total quarterly interest 
received divided by the average loans for the period less the total interest paid on 
deposits divided by average deposits.  But the ex post spread in reality does not 
represent the pricing power of banks.  There are several shortcomings.  First, the 
interest received by a bank already incorporates default risks – when a debtor defaults, 
a bank does not receive interest.  A debtor would not have lower default risk because 
the lender has more market share or because the banking industry is more or less 
concentrated.  Second, the interest rate received by a bank during the quarter does not 
represent the bank’s pricing power – the bank can be receiving interest this quarter 
from a loan made years ago.   
Empirical Results 
Before we get to the empirical results, we must first discuss the limitations of looking 
only at NIMs.  As mentioned earlier, by using market shares, we are examining 
whether banks benefit as described by Demsetz’s “superiority” hypothesis.  There are 
two sides when looking at a firm’s superiority – the cost side and the demand side.  
On the cost side, the concept can be illustrated by a simple Bertrand model.  First, 
assume there are 100 buyers of one unit each.  Each buyer has value of $1.00 for a unit 
with no service and $1.10 for a unit with service.  Assume constant returns to scale 
and that all sellers (banks) have marginal cost of ci = c = $0.25 for the product and of si 
= infinity for the service added to any unit.  And assume that N is large. 
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In a symmetric Bertrand game, P=MC implies that P=$0.25.  It is conventional but not 
necessary to assume that each firm sells 100/N units.  Clearly, P not only equals MC, 
but P=AC, and the profits are zero. 
Now, assume a firm learns how to produce units at MC<$0.25, say MC=$0.20.  It will 
charge a price equal to its rival’s MCs minus epsilon (price differences) and get the 
entire market.  To keep things simple, call the innovating firm, firm 1, and suppose 
that epsilon were a penny, $0.01.  Then price falls to P=0.24 and firm 1 share goes to 
100%, the entire market.  Note that the price of firm 1 falls as its share goes up (and it 
is conventional to say that all other firms remain in the market at price $0.25 and 
shares = 0).  The apparent “margin” in terms of price falls.  Or maybe put another way, 
the margin relative to MC, where MC is defined as pre-innovation MC has fallen from 
$0.00 to -0.01 (a negative margin).  The problem here is that the true margin has gone 
up from $0.00 to $0.04 for the superior firm.  To put into the context of this paper, we 
need to observe not only P (the lending rate) over time but also ci (the lending cost) 
over time.  This is the problem with looking at NIMs, they are pure prices, and do not 
reflect costs and cost changes over time.  Therefore, in this paper, results obtained 
from the regression do not examine the cost side of the superiority hypothesis.  But 
one can predict that if a bank does attain a cost advantage, then as the bank gains share, 
the NIMs go down. 
As for the demand side of the superiority hypothesis, we can illustrate some issues 
using a particular set of preferences.  This is a game in which consumers have 
preferences between sellers.  In particular these preferences are not at all like 
Hoetelling preferences (a much harder model) or like Chamberlin’s symmetric 
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differentiation.  They are simply that some consumers happen to like any seller who 
offers one unit of s per sale to all others if the prices are identical. 
Now again suppose firm 1 is a superior firm and learns how to add a unit of service to 
its product for s1 =0.05 (a nickel).  It could choose to not offer service, and earn zero 
profits and have a share of 100/N.  But it could offer service.  Service is worth $0.10 
to half the population.  To avoid epsilons, suppose that if sellers 2,...N are selling at 
P=0.25, that firm 1 can capture the service folks at $0.25 + $0.09 (nine cent premium, 
rather than a $0.099… premium reflecting an epsilon below $0.35). 
Firm 1 now has a price of $0.34 and earns unobservable profits of (0.09-
0.05)*50=$2.00 and its share increases to 50% of the market.  Firms 2,...N still charge 
a price of 0.25 in equilibrium and following convention each now has a share of 50/N. 
What one can observe, without seeing costs, is that the average price of product goes 
from $0.25 to $0.295 (using industry data) and firm 1's price goes from $0.25 to $0.34 
using firm data.  One cannot observe the superiority rents (market power) due to the 
fact that marginal costs, with and without service, are unobservable.  (Note that 
although firm 1's price goes up by $0.09, its margin only goes up by $0.04, but one 
can't see this if costs are unobservable). 
Here the superiority leads to a higher observed price (NIMs) for firm 1 because the 
superiority is on the demand side, not the cost side.  This is a story in which market 
share and NIMs are positively correlated.  So, cost side superiority leads to firm shares 
associated with lower firm NIMs and demand side superiority to firm shares 
associated with higher NIMs.  In what follows we find that NIMs are related to shares 
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as would be expected in a demand superiority model, not like they would be in a cost 
superiority model. 
Table 1: Variable Summary 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.          Min  Max 
NIMs 5278 3.571449 2.339307 0 64 
Debt to assets ratio 5272 89.76445 11.46907 0.73 99.17 
NPL percentage 5278 3.001228 2.432975 0 16.33 
Service/ interest income 5242 0.0571841 0.052747 0 0.779462 
Administrative cost/ total revenue 5260 23.23901 7.73967 0 64.17 
Discount rate 5278 3.575374 1.550582 1.25 6.25 
Base lending rate 5278 6.08897 1.898596 3.162 8.647 
Credit/ collateralized lending 5042 9.644629 69.92915 0 556.5624 
Liquid ratio 5272 0.2645425 0.0972346 0.0317914 0.9690241 
Loss reserve ratio 5199 1.231333 0.7663322 0 10.42 
Total assets growth 5260 15.03355 36.75141 -38.76 902.81 
Lending to deposit ratio 5244 90.19424 36.0609 0 508.93 
Bank asset to GDP 5149 5210.793 1385.181 818.3441 7586.106 
GDP growth rate 5149 4.721824 4.214922 -9.88 12.62 
Stock cap to GDP ratio 5149 0.7818385 1.335686 0.1760109 7.555964 
Monthly total assets 5279 1.35E+10 5.37E+09 0 2.15E+10 
Mkt share of credit lending 5230 0.0397706 0.0495375 0 0.4465027 
Mkt share of collateralized lending 5230 0.0397706 0.0485395 0 0.6360543 
Log total branches 4754 7.929741 0.19211 7.499424 8.105609 
Average monthly market share (%) 5117 2.214688 2.036833 0 9.21 
Bank branch market share 4651 0.0234938 0.0171975 0.0006037 0.0919118 
Average Monthly Deposit Market Share and Branch Market Share 
In spread estimations such as Peria and Mody (2004), authors usually make some 
assumptions in the panel regression analysis.  First, they assume there are no structural 
shifts in the relation between bank spreads and their determinants, and second, they 
ignore possible common shocks or time trends.  In this paper, we divide the time 
horizon into two sub-periods.  The first period is from year 1991 to 2000.  This is 
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because the first financial reform began in 2001 and worsened the situation; it induced 
the banks to engage in fierce competition for depositors by lowering the collateralized 
lending rate.  They wanted to get bigger in order to avoid being acquired and absorbed 
by competitors.  Therefore, after 2001 one may expect the deposit market share to 
have a negative impact on NIMs because the kind of market share was earned by 
lowering the NIMs.  Since the consolidation progressed quite slowly, this price war 
became a continuous practice, causing Taiwanese banks to have the lowest 
profitability in Asia.  The sub-periods are a unique aspect of this study.  By doing so, 
we can capture the structural shifts of the industry and conduct analysis without 
assuming there were not structural shifts, common shocks or time trends.   
Tables 2, 3 and 4 report the results of panel regressions based on the first two market 
share types.  The three tables are based on three different model specifications; Table 
2 is based on firm characteristics (base model), Table 3 adds control variables based 
on lending practice information, and Table 4 adds more control variables based on 
macroeconomic data.   
Table 2 reports the results of the base model.  Two types of market shares are included: 
the average monthly deposit market share and the bank branch market share.  The 
average monthly deposit market share is measured by a bank’s total deposit amount 
over the total deposits owned by the entire industry.  The second type of market share 
is the bank branch market share.  This proxy is rarely used, but in practice, the more 
branches a bank has, the more convenient it is for depositors to engage in daily 
transactions.  A higher bank branch market share may give a bank some power to 
price the loans higher since consumers may not compare the lending rates of all banks 
before making a borrowing decision.  Also, the branch market share is important 
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because first, depositors can sacrifice some pricing advantages for convenience, and 
second, a bank with a high branch market share may have a more established 
reputation in the marketplace, and depositors may not compare different deposit rates 
and go directly with large banks, implicitly ceding pricing power to the banks.  
Additionally, the higher a bank’s branch share is, the higher the service income, which 
may result in a higher service income to interest income ratio.  The panel regression 
already controls for this ratio, so if branch market share still has positive impact on 
NIMs, such impact may be the result of a bank’s unilateral market power.  With more 
branches, customers may find a bank more convenient and deposit their money at the 
bank.  With the higher demand for deposits, the bank may effectively lower the 
deposit rates and enjoy higher NIMs.  Later we will control for different lending 
practices to see which types of market shares directly impact the NIMs.  In Table 2, 
banks that have higher debt ratios have lower NIMs, and the result is economically 
and statistically significant and consistent across time periods.  The NPL percentage, 
which is the non-performing-loans to total loans ratio, has a positive effects on NIMs 
between 2001 and 2009.  Non-performing loans may be the result of risky lending.  
Banks generally charge higher lending rates for riskier borrowers.   
 . 
Table 2: Deposit and Branch Market Shares – Base Model 
Average monthly deposit and branch market shares are used as the explanatory variables of interest.  The regression model uses 
fundamental bank information, excluding macroeconomic and lending practice information.  Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Average Monthly Deposit Market Share Bank Branch Market Share 
All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.06503*** -0.03433*** -0.06772*** -0.18554*** -0.23689*** -0.07322*** 
 
(15.51) (4.95) (11.19) (43.33) (38.98) (11.89) 
NPL Percentage 0.06416*** 0.01672 0.12501*** 0.11648*** 0.04651 0.12597*** 
 (7.05) (1.02) (13.57) (10.26) (1.64) (13.55) 
Service Interest to Total Income 3.64992*** 11.69017*** 2.33535*** 4.44110*** 27.34636*** 2.23780*** 
 
(7.06) (8.68) (5.13) (7.27) (13.98) (4.82) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.03917*** 0.16737*** -0.03520*** 0.01251*** 0.15853*** -0.03369*** 
 
(11.35) (21.89) (9.89) (2.93) (12.02) (9.27) 
Discount Rates -0.05206*** -0.51979*** -0.11768*** -0.02824 -0.47715*** -0.10248*** 
(2.68) (8.86) (5.00) (1.22) (5.22) (4.27) 
Base Lending Rate 0.14704*** 0.77028*** -0.09895*** 0.01795 0.59308*** -0.10413*** 
 
(8.24) (8.80) (6.17) (0.85) (3.60) (6.38) 
Liquid Ratio 6.37397*** 5.24137*** 2.07630*** 6.80676*** -0.24302 2.42186*** 
 
(24.53) (10.44) (7.48) (21.40) (0.30) (8.19) 
Average Monthly MKT Share 0.15968*** 0.12501** -0.22880*** 
(5.97) (2.26) (6.44) 
Bank Branch MKT Share 0.48439*** 0.56965*** -0.06160* 
 
(14.73) (5.58) (1.90) 
Observations 5081 2290 2791 4621 1802 2819 
Number of Banks 32 29 32 32 29 32 
R-squared 0.23392 0.49333 0.24600 0.39503 0.59988 0.23167 
6
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The NPL percentage is then a proxy for the overall risk profile of bank’s lending 
portfolio.  The results are consistent with each other and significant at 1% level when 
the panel regressions include all observations from 2001 to 2009.  The reason why the 
NPL is not significant between 1991 and 2000 may be because banks mostly engaged 
in collateralized lending, and NPL ratio was consistently low at the time.  In Taiwan, 
the NPL was not a problem until banks began issuing too many credit cards and cash 
cards while underestimating or neglecting to monitor the default risks of the 
consumers. 
The administrative cost is the ratio of administrative expenses to average total assets.  
If banks incur high administrative costs in the process of providing their services as 
intermediaries, given the increased marginal cost, in equilibrium this should lead to 
higher lending rates for some or all banks.  In previous papers, including Peria and 
Mody (2004), this variable always has a positive impact in NIMs.  However, it is 
interesting to note that the administrative cost has different effects in different time 
periods in my sample.  Overall, the administrative cost has a positive effect on NIMs, 
but between 2001 and 2009, the effect is negative.  It illustrates a unique phenomenon 
in the Taiwanese banking industry such that banks were still expanding rapidly during 
the period, resulting in higher administrative cost, but they were not able to pass the 
expenses on to the borrowers and depositors for fear of losing market shares.   
The liquid ratio is measured as the ratio of liquid assets to total assets.  Liquid assets 
are defined as cash, deposits in other banks and excess reserves at the central bank.  
Excess reserves are defined as the federal deposits in excess of the required reserves.  
For example, a bank has a deposit of $100, and if the Federal Reserve requirement is 
63 
 
10%, then $10 will be the required reserve.  If the bank deposits $20 at the central 
bank for the $100 deposit, then the $10 is the excess reserve.  In the literature, high 
liquidity ratios are said to inflict a cost on banks since they have to give up holding 
higher-yielding assets.  Supposedly, banks would transfer this opportunity cost to 
borrowers, resulting in higher spreads.  In Table 2, one can see that in all samples and 
sub-samples except one, higher liquidity ratios do result in higher NIMs.   
The average monthly market share and bank branch market share both have positive 
and significant impacts on NIMs for the entire sample and between 1991 and 2000.  
But from 2001 to 2009, the average monthly market share has a negative impact on 
NIMs.  In Taiwan, after the first financial reform, according to Current Asian Banker 
Analysis’s publication in 2006, banks began issuing credit cards and cash cards 
because they yielded higher interests. Gradually, banks’ operations became largely 
focused on credit lending.  The fact that the average monthly market share has a 
negative impact from 2001 to 2009 may potentially be attributed to the changing 
lending practice from collateralized lending to credit lending.  As Taiwanese banks 
became more leveraged and focused on credit lending, the deposit and branch market 
shares became less relevant.   
Table 3 adds several more control variables.  With these additional variables, samples 
and sub-sample panel regressions all have improved R-squares.  This regression model 
includes the variables from the base model and four other variables that are related to a 
bank’s internal operation and lending practices. 
The loan-loss reserve is what the bank managers set aside from earnings to prepare for 
possible defaults.  The managers have a lot of latitude in deciding how much to set 
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aside, and this amount would be booked as expenses.  If the loan-loss reserve 
overestimates the actual default rate, the remaining amount shows on the next year’s 
financial statement as the loan recovery.  There are several reasons why managers set 
aside different amounts in different years.  First, if a manager feels that the bank’s 
lending portfolio is riskier than that of the previous year, the manager will set aside a 
higher portion of earnings into the loan-loss reserve.  The loan-loss reserve to total 
lending ratio is another proxy for portfolio risk.  Second, managers may also set aside 
such funding in preparation for a possible downturn of the financial market.  Third, 
managers also use it as a tool for income management in order to meet analyst 
expectations.   
Table 3 shows that the overall effect of the loan-loss reserve to total lending ratio is 
positive and significant.  However, in subsamples, the effects are positive between 
2001 and 2009 and negative between 1991 and 2000.  As mentioned above, Taiwanese 
banks mostly engaged in collateralized lending in the early years of deregulation, and 
future cash flows from collateralized lending were more predictable.  The bank 
managers may have been setting aside money for a possible financial downturn 
instead of using the loan-loss reserve as a risk management tool.   
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Table 3: Deposit and Branch Market Shares – Adding Lending Practice Information 
Average monthly deposit and branch market shares are used as the explanatory variables of interest. The regression model uses 
fundamental bank information, excluding macroeconomic and lending practice information. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
Average Monthly Deposit Market Share Bank Branch Market Share 
All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.03246*** -0.03401*** -0.06153*** -0.18169*** -0.21607*** -0.06725*** 
(7.09) (5.10) (10.35) (43.43) (37.26) (11.08) 
NPL Percentage 0.06000*** 0.07866*** 0.12781*** 0.11713*** 0.13906*** 0.12817*** 
(6.58) (5.13) (13.73) (10.41) (5.19) (13.63) 
Service Interest to Total Income Ratio 3.92158*** 13.12071*** 1.40197*** 4.14365*** 25.60361*** 1.35685*** 
(7.49) (9.57) (2.98) (6.71) (12.75) (2.83) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.03305*** 0.15423*** -0.02727*** 0.00750* 0.12635*** -0.02594*** 
(9.61) (22.34) (7.73) (1.79) (10.46) (7.18) 
Discount Rates -0.07128*** -0.28636*** -0.06618*** -0.04543** -0.07021 -0.05204** 
(3.66) (4.95) (2.83) (1.99) (0.72) (2.18) 
Base Lending Rate 0.15457*** 0.57027*** -0.09410*** 0.00426 0.31988** -0.09636*** 
(8.95) (6.80) (6.01) (0.21) (2.11) (6.04) 
Liquid Ratio 5.33713*** 1.42019*** 1.77920*** 7.13189*** -0.21343 2.19049*** 
(20.80) (2.87) (6.61) (23.11) (0.26) (7.62) 
Loss Reserve to Total Lending Ratio 0.17275*** -0.25029*** 0.05006** 0.08386*** -0.05653 0.05175** 
(7.11) (2.98) (2.43) (2.98) (0.44) (2.45) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.01306*** 0.01269*** 0.01701*** 0.01163*** 0.00611*** 0.01716*** 
(17.23) (17.86) (13.84) (20.21) (8.12) (13.66) 
Lending to Deposit Ratio -0.00574*** -0.03142*** -0.00210*** -0.00452*** -0.04210*** -0.00208*** 
(7.65) (14.36) (3.28) (5.10) (11.49) (3.19) 
Credit-to-Collateralized Lending Ratio -0.00072*** 0.02709 -0.00064* -0.00031 -0.11461 -0.00050 
(2.68) (0.29) (1.76) (0.96) (0.73) (1.36) 
Average Monthly MKT Share 0.10812*** 0.18975*** -0.25218*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Continued 
(3.95) (3.87) (7.18) 
Bank Branch MKT Share 0.53610*** 0.50941*** -0.04771 
(16.23) (5.41) (1.49) 
Observations 4947 2214 2733 4524 1763 2761 
Number of Banks 32 29 32 32 29 32 
R-squared 0.29187 0.62342 0.29645 0.45581 0.69793 0.28113 
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As for the total asset growth rate, given that the shareholders’ equity at book does not 
fluctuate greatly from year to year, the total assets growth mainly reflects an increase 
in deposits.  A bank that is growing in deposits would have more room for profitable 
but riskier lending.  The overall effect of the total asset growth rate is positive and 
significant for all samples. 
The lending to deposit ratio is the total lending to the total deposit ratio.  The lending 
to deposit ratio has the same effect on the bank lending practices as the debt-to-asset 
ratio.  If a bank’s deposits are low compared to what the bank has lent out, then a bank 
would be forced to engage in more prudent lending practices, avoiding higher risk 
borrowers.  Table 3 shows that the lending to deposit ratio has a negative and 
significant effect on NIMs, indicating that banks with higher ratios make loans at 
lower NIMs across all periods. 
Table 4 includes additional variables based on macroeconomic data.  For the third 
model specification, we incorporate the total bank assets as an indicator of market 
structure and scale effects.  The total bank assets to GDP ratio is a proxy for the 
banking industry’s power in the country.  If the ratio is large, it means that the banking 
industry is more powerful in the country.  In the panel regression analysis, we get 
positive and significant results for all samples except for monthly average deposit 
market share from 1991 to 2000.  It means that the banking industry is able to impose 
higher NIMs as it becomes larger relative to the country’s economy.  
The annual GDP growth rate provides inconclusive results.  A central bank tends to 
raise interest rates during a bull market to fight inflation, and banks follow suit to raise 
their lending rates.  As a result, banks usually experience high NIMs when the GDP 
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growth rate is high.  Of course, to attract more deposits to fuel a bank’s lending 
activity, it has to raise the deposit rate eventually.  But there is usually a lag between 
the raising of the lending rate and the raising of the deposit interest rate, and Table 4’s 
inconclusive results may be a result of this lag.   
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Table 4: Deposit and Branch Market Shares – Adding Macroeconomic Information 
Average monthly deposit and branch market shares are used as the explanatory variables of interest.  The regression model uses fundamental 
bank information, lending practice and macroeconomic information. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Average Monthly Deposit Market Share Bank Branch Market Share 
All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.04030*** -0.03870*** -0.06353*** -0.05996*** -0.06785*** -0.07091*** 
 
(8.19) (5.54) (9.76) (9.66) (5.16) (10.74) 
NPL Percentage 0.05840*** 0.03055* 0.13299*** 0.08685*** 0.05954*** 0.13684*** 
 
(6.33) (1.82) (13.34) (9.25) (3.14) (13.70) 
Service Interest to Total Income Ratio 3.88882*** 12.07762*** 1.22730*** 3.53967*** 14.33368*** 1.16710** 
 
(7.50) (8.83) (2.60) (6.83) (10.59) (2.43) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.03024*** 0.15156*** -0.02740*** 0.01127*** 0.16136*** -0.02671*** 
 
(8.60) (21.28) (7.42) (3.14) (19.26) (7.11) 
Discount Rates -0.08349*** 0.21138** -0.05050** 0.04239* 0.26551** -0.03941 
 
(3.70) (2.31) (1.98) (1.76) (2.50) (1.51) 
Base Lending Rate 0.11540*** 0.15396 -0.07554*** 0.07552*** 0.33024*** -0.06835*** 
 
(6.27) (1.61) (4.34) (4.19) (2.79) (3.86) 
Liquid Ratio 5.15146*** 1.55733*** 1.84433*** 5.93222*** 1.13674* 2.30483*** 
 
(18.56) (2.77) (6.47) (20.73) (1.86) (7.79) 
Loss Reserve to Total Lending 0.15884*** -0.29814*** 0.03983* 0.12539*** -0.15460* 0.03776* 
 
(6.60) (3.56) (1.91) (5.35) (1.87) (1.78) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.00973*** 0.01286*** 0.01553*** 0.00341*** -0.00052 0.01537*** 
 
(10.15) (11.20) (12.39) (2.77) (0.27) (12.03) 
Lending to Deposit Ratio -0.00519*** -0.02972*** -0.00236*** -0.00410*** -0.03435*** -0.00243*** 
 
(6.91) (12.62) (3.69) (5.49) (13.59) (3.74) 
Credit-to-Collateralized Lending  -0.00078*** -0.09523 -0.00063* -0.00044 0.06189 -0.00049 
 
(2.92) (1.03) (1.75) (1.64) (0.59) (1.33) 
Bank Assets to GDP Ratio -20.79080*** -29.56286*** 10.54492*** 11.06077*** 10.15738* 11.57668*** 
 
(8.47) (9.26) (3.07) (3.19) (1.87) (3.31) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Continued 
GDP Growth Rate -0.01890*** -0.05628*** 0.01198*** 0.00385 -0.01886 0.01177*** 
 
(4.00) (4.12) (2.78) (0.79) (1.30) (2.68) 
Stock Capitalization to GDP Ratio -0.08756*** 0.64845*** -0.02012* -0.09836*** 1.11856*** -0.02891** 
 
(6.46) (2.66) (1.80) (7.37) (4.49) (2.52) 
Monthly Total Assets 0.36699*** 0.93384*** 0.33883 0.27287** -0.05567 0.58025*** 
 
(3.80) (5.78) (1.56) (2.43) (0.26) (2.62) 
Average Monthly MKT Share 0.10014*** 0.11480** -0.23911*** 
 
(3.65) (2.33) (6.72) 
Bank Branch MKT Share 0.40110*** -0.035820 -0.047369 
 
(14.36) (0.47) (1.42) 
Observations 4922 2189 2733 4507 1746 2761 
Number of Banks 32 29 32 32 29 32 
R-squared 0.28840 0.61266 0.30484 0.25143 0.36631 0.29347 
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The average monthly deposit market share yields significant results consistent with the 
previous two model specifications, and the branch market share’s aggregate sample 
result is significant and consistent as well.  However, the subsamples’ results are 
insignificant in this model specification.  Moreover, this specification is not better than 
the second one based on the R-square, since the R-squares are all lower than those of 
the second model specification. 
Based on the above results, we can see that the deposit market shares and branch 
market shares overall are positively correlated with banks’ NIMs.  But the coefficients 
become negative between 2001-2009.  It indicates that the absolute size and the 
number of branches do not provide a bank with an advantage during this period.  
Interpreting the results from the demand side of the superiority hypothesis, bank sizes 
(the level of deposits and the number of physical locations) allow the banks to enjoy 
greater demands during 1991-2000, pushing up the NIMs.  This advantage may be 
attributed to superior convenience to the depositors or more popular choices for 
borrowers (a popular bank may have been the first place to go to obtain loans).  
During 2001-2009, the above advantages may disappear as many banks have a higher 
number of branches, borrowers have easier access to bank lending information, and 
collateralized lending became less profitable for banks due to the increasing 
competition.   
Credit Lending and Collateralized Lending Market Shares 
This section includes the regression results based on the other two types of market 
shares, credit lending market share and collateralized lending market share.  They each 
represent different types of lending and are used not only as unilateral market power 
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proxies but also to capture the structural shift in the Taiwanese banking industry.  Here 
we again make the distinction between the collusive firms and the superiority 
hypotheses.  Market shares are distinct from concentration.  By examining market 
shares, we see whether banks seem to have higher pricing advantage due to having a 
degree of superiority in their product offerings.  Based on these two proxies, we 
conduct panel regression analyses based on the previous three model specifications to 
determine whether the regressions yield consistent results.  Since credit lending 
market share and collateralized market share are explanatory variables, the credit 
lending to collateralized lending ratio is excluded from the variable list.  
In Table 5, the regression results indicate consistent implications with those of the 
base model regression using the monthly average deposit market share and branch 
market share.  The market shares of credit lending and collateralized lending are 
important factors that affect the NIMs.   
First, the credit lending market share is highly significant in affecting the level of 
NIMs, and its effect is stronger for the second sub-period.  As discussed earlier, the 
lending practice shifted from collateralized to credit lending, and the results here 
indicate this shift as well.  The results show that, given this shift, in the second sub-
period one can see that a bank’s credit lending market share gives greater power to a 
bank to charge higher NIMs.  Second, credit card or cash card products are mostly 
homogeneous since they are just small credit loans in nature, so a relatively popular 
cash card or credit card may induce potential customers to apply, raising the demand 
and resulting in higher lending rates. 
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The collateralized lending market share, on the other hand, has significant impacts 
between 1999 and 2000, but it loses its significance from 2001 to 2009.  This implies 
that the Taiwanese banks strayed away from safer lending practices (making loans 
based on collateral) and let the profitability be driven by credit loans.  Without proper 
risk monitoring, given that the result of credit loans are much harder to predict than 
collateralized loans, the banks faced the danger of higher default rates if hit by an 
economic slump, which did happen in 2004. 
In addition, the R-squares for the period between 1991 and 2000 are much higher than 
for the period between 2001 and 2009, showing that the model specification works 
much better in the early years of the financial liberalization.  After the market became 
saturated in the beginning of the millennium, the gradual reduction in the number of 
banks had not helped the banks resuscitate their profitability; the competition is still 
fierce.  The gradual, and continuing reduction in the number of banks is mostly a 
result of unprofitable banks becoming insolvent and exiting the industry through 
acquisitions by other larger banks.   
There is a dramatic period-to-period change in the statistical significance of the 
service income to total income ratio.  As discussed earlier, banks may charge higher 
lending rates if they have a higher portion of income coming from service fees, and 
the results are highly significant in the period of 1991-2000.  But the variable 
experiences a drop in significance for 2001-2009.   
Table 6 is based on the second model specification.  The R-squares are improved with 
additional bank information as they were previously.  For the period between 1991 
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and 2000, the R-squares are as high as 0.76, indicating a very high predictive power.  
The two market shares yield consistent results as before. 
Table 7 is based on the third model specification, and it shows consistent results.  
However, it does not exhibit higher R-squares as before.  One potential reason is that 
the credit lending market share may not be important to demand side superiority.  For 
example, when one owns a mortgage, it is not necessary to visit the bank frequently.  
For daily transactions, he may use another bank and visit the bank’s branches often.  
So demand superiority based on locational convenience may only be based on deposits, 
and not on loans. 
The GDP annual growth rate still exhibits a negative relationship with the NIMs in the 
period between 1991 and 2000 and positive in the period between 2001 and 2009.  
Typically, the GDP growth should be positively related to NIMs because the central 
bank tends to raise interest rate to combat inflation, but our data does not show that 
higher GDP growth is accompanied by higher NIMs.   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Credit Lending and Collateralized Lending Market Shares – Base Model 
Monthly credit lending market share and collateralized lending market share are used as the explanatory variables of interest.  The regression 
model uses fundamental bank information, excluding macroeconomic and lending practice information.  Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Credit Lending Collateralized Lending 
All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.12560*** -0.18245*** -0.01779*** -0.12448*** -0.18370*** -0.01844*** 
(32.39) (32.78) (4.61) (32.16) (33.43) (4.75) 
NPL Percentage 0.10167*** -0.00916 0.12463*** 0.09650*** 0.01099 0.11910*** 
(7.37) (0.37) (13.23) (7.03) (0.45) (12.60) 
Service Interest to Total Income Ratio 12.80739*** 33.15070*** 1.54377*** 12.96833*** 33.46166*** 1.34533*** 
(20.72) (37.72) (3.42) (20.99) (38.34) (2.98) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.00636 0.05634*** -0.02513*** 0.00670 0.06152*** -0.02702*** 
(1.28) (6.01) (6.90) (1.35) (6.55) (7.44) 
Discount Rates 0.08606*** -0.48621*** -0.16855*** 0.08742*** -0.46846*** -0.17106*** 
(2.95) (5.09) (7.23) (2.99) (4.95) (7.28) 
Base Lending Rate 0.02408 -0.05262 -0.06029*** 0.03150 -0.10843 -0.06231*** 
(0.92) (0.35) (3.81) (1.21) (0.74) (3.90) 
Liquid Ratio 6.66927*** 6.29387*** 1.97553*** 6.75137*** 6.13639*** 1.76519*** 
(17.84) (8.32) (7.51) (18.06) (8.16) (6.62) 
Mkt Share of Credit Lending 5.42561*** 3.65599*** 6.54808*** 
(7.12) (4.59) (4.55) 
Collateralized Lending Mkt Share 4.05908*** 4.73289*** 0.17938 
(6.13) (6.72) (0.14) 
Observations 5230 2322 2908 5230 2322 2908 
Number of Banks 34 31 34 34 31 34 
R-squared 0.37784 0.70559 0.19732 0.37627 0.70863 0.19153 
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Table 6: Credit Lending and Collateralized Lending Market Shares – Adding Lending Practice Information 
Monthly credit lending market share and collateralized lending market share are used as the explanatory variables of interest. The 
regression model uses fundamental bank information and lending practice information, excluding macroeconomic information.  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Credit Lending Collateralized Lending 
All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.12989*** -0.17699*** -0.02396*** -0.12919*** -0.17906*** -0.02512*** 
 
(33.81) (33.74) (5.69) (33.66) (34.61) (5.94) 
NPL Percentage 0.10487*** 0.05813** 0.11825*** 0.09825*** 0.07367*** 0.11433*** 
 
(7.73) (2.37) (12.29) (7.30) (3.02) (11.78) 
Service Interest to Total Income Ratio 13.46061*** 29.83820*** 1.43106*** 13.62388*** 30.17610*** 1.18764*** 
 
(22.54) (35.45) (3.12) (22.83) (36.14) (2.59) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.00163 0.04865*** -0.02518*** 0.00092 0.05350*** -0.02682*** 
 
(0.33) (4.98) (6.85) (0.19) (5.50) (7.31) 
Discount Rates 0.08460*** -0.23835*** -0.14301*** 0.08206*** -0.22810** -0.14337*** 
 
(2.97) (2.60) (6.07) (2.88) (2.52) (6.03) 
Base Lending Rate 0.03026 -0.08768 -0.05863*** 0.03684 -0.17272 -0.06213*** 
 
(1.20) (0.64) (3.69) (1.47) (1.29) (3.88) 
Liquid Ratio 6.13545*** 4.83278*** 2.02017*** 6.18788*** 4.53672*** 1.77151*** 
(16.90) (6.41) (7.55) (17.05) (6.05) (6.53) 
Loss Reserve to Total Lending Ratio 0.06246* -0.36152** 0.06007*** 0.07261** -0.30781** 0.05561** 
(1.72) (2.54) (2.77) (2.00) (2.19) (2.56) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.00880*** 0.00729*** 0.00504*** 0.00879*** 0.00731*** 0.00530*** 
(14.41) (10.26) (7.32) (14.38) (10.44) (7.66) 
Lending to Deposit Ratio -0.01220*** -0.04258*** -0.00199*** -0.01206*** -0.04308*** -0.00184*** 
(11.03) (12.86) (2.95) (10.89) (13.20) (2.72) 
Mkt Share of Credit Lending 5.93356*** 3.84844*** 6.36734*** 
(7.82) (4.99) (4.43) 
Collateralized Lending Mkt Share 4.54213*** 5.05363*** -0.53637 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 Continued 
 
(7.19) (7.87) (0.41) 
Observations 5187 2302 2885 5187 2302 2885 
Number of Banks 33 30 33 33 30 33 
R-squared 0.43807 0.75882 0.21904 0.43704 0.76267 0.21369 
7
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The market stock cap to the quarterly GDP ratio represents the strength of the capital 
market.  The regression from the overall sample indicates that if the market index, 
which consists of the largest corporations in the country, is performing strongly 
relatively to the nation’s GDP, it has negative impacts on NIMs.  In subsamples, the 
effect is positive during 1991 to 2000 and it has a negative impact during 2001 to 2009.  
Usually, a strong growth prospect (indicated by a high stock-cap-to-GDP ratio) should 
increase demand for loans, driving up lending rates.  But based on our data, the results 
are inconclusive.  
Based on the above results, we can see that collateralized lending market shares cease 
to give banks advantages such that higher collateralized market shares do not drive up 
NIMs during 2001-2009.  After 2001, credit lending becomes more crucial for banks’ 
profitability, and if a bank can produce popular credit cards or cash cards (small credit 
loans), their popularity may drive up demand for loans and raise the bank’s NIMs.  
This also provides support for Demsetz’s superiority hypothesis when the changing 
lending practice is taken into account.  
 
 
 7
9
 
Table 7 : Credit Lending and Collateralized Lending Market Shares – Adding Macroeconomic 
Information 
Monthly credit lending market share and collateralized lending market share are used as the explanatory variables of interest. The 
regression model uses fundamental bank information, lending practice information and macroeconomic information.  Absolute value 
of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Credit Lending Collateralized Lending 
 
All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.04527*** -0.02947*** -0.06678*** -0.04413*** -0.03374*** -0.06564*** 
 
(9.07) (4.47) (10.28) (8.90) (5.13) (10.04) 
NPL Percentage 0.06796*** 0.00253 0.13606*** 0.06397*** 0.00899 0.13072*** 
 
(7.39) (0.16) (13.98) (7.01) (0.57) (13.30) 
Service Interest to Total Income  3.58904*** 8.06275*** 1.48868*** 3.74984*** 8.24047*** 1.12515** 
 
(7.20) (6.85) (3.23) (7.54) (7.03) (2.44) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.03093*** 0.15013*** -0.02275*** 0.02988*** 0.15683*** -0.02423*** 
 
(8.84) (20.95) (6.15) (8.57) (21.86) (6.53) 
Discount Rates -0.03138 0.21714** -0.03018 -0.04229* 0.17807** -0.03127 
 
(1.36) (2.39) (1.17) (1.87) (1.97) (1.21) 
Base Lending Rate 0.10636*** 0.17348* -0.05879*** 0.10733*** 0.14994 -0.06584*** 
 
(5.78) (1.86) (3.34) (5.83) (1.61) (3.71) 
Liquid Ratio 5.81027*** 2.08095*** 2.78083*** 5.78300*** 1.78543*** 2.41221*** 
 
(20.97) (3.76) (9.63) (20.90) (3.22) (8.32) 
Loss Reserve to Total Lending  0.15232*** -0.30219*** 0.05151** 0.15887*** -0.27804*** 0.04989** 
 
(6.31) (3.64) (2.45) (6.58) (3.34) (2.36) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.01048*** 0.01167*** 0.01481*** 0.01022*** 0.01304*** 0.01603*** 
 
(10.81) (9.87) (11.64) (10.58) (11.19) (12.47) 
Lending to Deposit Ratio -0.00573*** -0.02843*** -0.00254*** -0.00559*** -0.02953*** -0.00239*** 
 
(7.59) (12.17) (3.92) (7.40) (12.58) (3.67) 
Bank Assets to GDP Ratio -15.76297*** -35.38536*** 14.04391*** -17.54651*** -27.84597*** 13.30336*** 
 
(5.95) (10.19) (4.11) (6.85) (8.27) (3.87) 
   Table 7 Continued 
GDP Growth Rate -0.01376*** -0.06601*** 0.01471*** -0.01525*** -0.05344*** 0.01384*** 
 
(2.88) (4.84) (3.42) (3.21) (3.95) (3.20) 
Stock Capitalization to GDP Ratio -0.09349*** 0.79136*** -0.04606*** -0.09384*** 0.78051*** -0.04095*** 
 
(7.03) (3.25) (4.15) (7.05) (3.21) (3.68) 
Monthly Total Assets 0.56520*** 1.04400*** 0.42608** 0.55240*** 1.05445*** 0.34439 
 
(5.89) (6.60) (2.01) (5.77) (6.69) (1.62) 
Mkt Share of Credit Lending 4.45871*** -1.32599* 7.60108*** 
 
(6.32) (1.78) (5.48) 
Collateralized Lending Mkt Share 3.25418*** 1.93268*** -1.10599 
 
(6.06) (3.61) (0.87) 
Observations 5092 2241 2851 5092 2241 2851 
Number of Banks 32 29 32 32 29 32 
R-squared 0.29121 0.60319 0.30638 0.29077 0.60496 0.29915 
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Market Concentration 
In this section, we examine the correlations between NIMs and different types of 
market concentration.  The market concentrations used in this paper are Herfindahl 
indices, calculated as the sum of squared market shares of each bank.  As discussed 
earlier, we are trying to examine the correlations between NIMs and their determinants.  
Only a general discussion of the results is included. 
Overall, the regression results are inconclusive and provide little support for Bain’s 
collusion hypothesis.   The coefficients across different model specifications and time 
periods are unstable.  The coefficients of different concentration measures yield 
opposite but significant results.  For example, in Table 8 and 9, the market branch 
Herfindahl index for the overall period yielded significant results, but the coefficients 
have opposite signs for the first two model specifications (negative and then positive).  
Table 10 then yields a negative and significant coefficient for the overall period. 
When we turn to the Herfindahl indices for credit lending and collateralized lending, 
the results are more consistent.  Both types of Herfindahl indices in Table 11-13 
indicate that for the overall period and the first period (1991-2000), there is evidence 
of collusion based on the data such that higher market concentrations lead to higher 
NIMs.  But this effect disappeared during 2001 to 2009 such that higher market 
concentration for both types of lending leads to lower NIMs.  As discussed earlier, this 
is a period of fierce pricing wars and industry consolidation, and the result may 
potentially be attributed to the rapid erosion of NIMs among banks.  In other words, 
during this period, the Herfindahl indices became higher but NIMs continued to drop. 
This may yield a negative correlation between the Herfindahl indices and NIMs during 
he period.  It also does not provide support for Bain’s collusion hypothesis. 
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  Table 8: Herfindahls based on Bank Deposits and Branches - Base Model 
Average monthly deposit and branch market shares are used as the explanatory variables of interest.  The regression model uses 
fundamental bank information, excluding macroeconomic and lending practice information.  Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Herfindahl based on Bank Deposits Herfindahl based on Bank Branches 
 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.12096*** -0.18250*** -0.00928** -0.11950*** -0.18089*** -0.00869** 
 (31.72) (33.52) (2.35) (30.98) (33.49) (2.21) 
NPL Percentage 0.08404*** -0.01231 0.10699*** 0.08789*** -0.07799*** 0.10342*** 
 (6.20) (0.51) (11.47) (6.37) (3.02) (11.04) 
Service Interest to Total Income 13.23573*** 32.88878*** 1.67148*** 13.25493*** 33.11185*** 1.55452*** 
 (21.48) (37.65) (3.75) (21.42) (38.04) (3.50) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.00635 0.04457*** -0.01858*** 0.00597 0.06728*** -0.01838*** 
 (1.28) (4.78) (5.03) (1.20) (7.10) (4.99) 
Discount Rates 0.04834 -0.39797*** -0.05852** 0.09784*** -0.48827*** -0.06258** 
 (1.60) (4.24) (2.25) (3.34) (5.19) (2.45) 
Base Lending Rate -0.00436 -0.15891 -0.12574*** 0.02871 0.92955*** -0.10500*** 
 (0.16) (1.08) (7.38) (1.04) (5.46) (6.48) 
Liquid Ratio 6.23430*** 6.09701*** 0.84729*** 6.66575*** 6.78287*** 0.84165*** 
 (16.02) (8.16) (3.10) (17.08) (9.17) (3.09) 
Deposit Herfindahl -42.72997*** -58.40136*** -108.38176***    
 (5.91) (6.84) (9.33)    
Branch Herfindahl   -7.59199** 35.74178*** -48.13836*** 
    (2.09) (7.17) (9.73) 
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Observations 5242 2334 2908 5242 2334 2908 
Number of Banks 34 31 34 34 31 34 
R-squared 0.37606 0.70882 0.21535 0.37240 0.70940 0.21737 
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Table 9: Herfindahls based on Bank Deposits and Branches - Adding Lending Practice Information 
Average monthly deposit and branch market shares are used as the explanatory variables of interest. The regression model uses 
fundamental bank information, excluding macroeconomic and lending practice information. Absolute value of t statistics in 
parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 Herfindahl based on Bank Deposits Herfindahl based on Bank Branches 
 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.17667*** -0.17638*** -0.05389*** -0.17994*** -0.17517*** -0.05184*** 
 (45.44) (33.97) (8.21) (45.57) (33.58) (7.90) 
NPL Percentage 0.09102*** 0.06923*** 0.11780*** 0.08076*** 0.02820 0.11499*** 
 (7.37) (2.85) (12.30) (6.44) (1.07) (11.94) 
Service Interest to Total Income 17.70783*** 31.08173*** 1.60124*** 17.66008*** 31.51755*** 1.53622*** 
 (30.67) (36.36) (3.33) (30.62) (36.81) (3.20) 
Administrative Cost Percentage -0.00413 0.04804*** -0.02164*** -0.00371 0.06019*** -0.02090*** 
 (0.90) (4.90) (5.83) (0.81) (6.06) (5.63) 
Discount Rates 0.05556** -0.03627 -0.02865 0.06411** -0.10690 -0.02480 
 (2.03) (0.39) (1.12) (2.41) (1.13) (0.98) 
Base Lending Rate 0.06847*** -0.09451 -0.10624*** 0.12615*** 0.47421*** -0.09944*** 
 (2.82) (0.66) (6.33) (5.15) (2.91) (6.20) 
Liquid Ratio 6.55249*** 3.77862*** 1.93548*** 7.29438*** 4.15112*** 1.85923*** 
 (18.53) (4.95) (6.53) (20.48) (5.41) (6.32) 
Loss Reserve to Total Lending Ratio 0.11569*** -0.32449** 0.07100*** 0.12226*** -0.20620 0.07207*** 
 (3.46) (2.28) (3.34) (3.67) (1.45) (3.40) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.00687*** 0.00636*** 0.01657*** 0.00754*** 0.00630*** 0.01660*** 
 (10.88) (9.15) (13.04) (11.92) (9.03) (13.14) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 Continued       
Lending to Deposit Ratio -0.00898*** -0.04481*** -0.00195*** -0.00854*** -0.04421*** -0.00196*** 
 (8.81) (13.74) (2.98) (8.36) (13.32) (3.00) 
Credit-to-Collateralized Lending -0.00113*** -0.17812 -0.00049 -0.00119*** -0.18824 -0.00051 
 (3.07) (1.27) (1.33) (3.26) (1.34) (1.39) 
Deposit Herfindahl -16.71014** -44.24583*** -45.96409***    
 (2.53) (5.45) (3.75)    
Branch Herfindahl    15.19869*** 15.99483*** -23.44774*** 
    (4.52) (3.34) (4.52) 
Observations 5027 2233 2794 5027 2233 2794 
Number of Banks 32 29 32 32 29 32 
R-squared 0.54128 0.77392 0.28268 0.54258 0.77202 0.28432 
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A potential reason for some of the inconclusive results for Table 8-10 may be caused 
by the overall low concentration of the Taiwanese banking industry.  As mentioned 
earlier, the top 3 banks in Taiwan only sum up to less than 20% market share.  Based 
on general findings using Herfindahl indices (Geithman, Marvel and Weiss, 1981), if 
the top four (top eight firms) firms’ market shares sum up to less than 50% (70%) the 
derivative of profits with respect to concentration is essential zero.  This means that 
any meaningful results would have to come from data sets which have higher 
concentration.   
Furthermore, based on Taiwan’s Financial Supervisory Commission’s report, out of 
the top 10 banks in Taiwan, nine are government-owned or the government has the 
majority shares.  It is quite possible that government banks are not likely to be 
collusive between each other or with private sector rivals, and government banks 
should not set prices to maximize profits but should maximize the consumer welfare  
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Table 10: Herfindahls based on Bank Deposits and Branches - Adding Macroeconomic Information 
Average monthly deposit and branch market shares are used as the explanatory variables of interest.  The regression model uses fundamental 
bank information, lending practice and macroeconomic information. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Herfindahl based on Bank Deposits Herfindahl based on Bank Branches 
 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.03778*** -0.02580*** -0.05966*** -0.03426*** -0.03621*** -0.05906*** 
 (7.72) (3.81) (9.11) (6.93) (5.48) (9.10) 
NPL Percentage 0.05887*** 0.01423 0.13520*** 0.05955*** 0.01010 0.13680*** 
 (6.32) (0.90) (13.74) (6.45) (0.63) (14.00) 
Service Interest to Total Income  4.13089*** 10.95732*** 1.35435*** 3.96478*** 12.15072*** 1.13212** 
 (7.89) (7.93) (2.83) (7.56) (8.90) (2.38) 
Administrative Cost Percentage 0.02704*** 0.15423*** -0.02413*** 0.02709*** 0.15302*** -0.02447*** 
 (7.67) (21.60) (6.50) (7.72) (21.45) (6.64) 
Discount Rates -0.06664*** 0.12942 -0.02898 -0.04549** 0.10401 -0.04444* 
 (2.94) (1.40) (1.12) (1.96) (1.09) (1.73) 
Base Lending Rate 0.09712*** 0.27398*** -0.05944*** 0.08879*** 0.37761*** -0.00633 
 (5.17) (2.80) (3.38) (4.78) (3.34) (0.34) 
Liquid Ratio 5.54071*** 1.64172*** 1.92084*** 5.43984*** 1.61177*** 1.82978*** 
 (19.90) (2.96) (6.55) (19.57) (2.89) (6.33) 
Loss Reserve to Total Lending 0.15455*** -0.27549*** 0.05581*** 0.15532*** -0.31947*** 0.05496*** 
 (6.36) (3.29) (2.65) (6.41) (3.84) (2.63) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.00953*** 0.01335*** 0.01373*** 0.00957*** 0.01238*** 0.01355*** 
 (9.84) (11.57) (10.62) (9.91) (10.80) (10.63) 
Lending to Deposit Ratio -0.00566*** -0.02897*** -0.00216*** -0.00573*** -0.02886*** -0.00215*** 
 (7.45) (12.39) (3.33) (7.56) (12.31) (3.34) 
Credit-to-Collateralized Lending  -0.00094*** -0.21486** -0.00044 -0.00093*** -0.11098 -0.00047 
 (3.55) (2.28) (1.20) (3.52) (1.21) (1.28) 
Bank Assets to GDP Ratio -21.83327*** -40.23366*** 4.97412 -23.95032*** -24.22385*** 0.23261 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 10 continued       
 (8.19) (10.15) (1.35) (9.45) (6.61) (0.06) 
GDP Growth Rate -0.01923*** -0.05270*** 0.01253*** -0.01670*** -0.06393*** 0.00607 
 (4.00) (3.86) (2.88) (3.48) (4.66) (1.38) 
Stock Capitalization to GDP Ratio -0.09020*** 0.66033*** -0.00448 -0.07861*** 1.03643*** 0.00786 
 (6.27) (2.72) (0.36) (5.72) (3.89) (0.64) 
Monthly Total Assets 0.40050*** 1.13940*** 2.03419*** 0.69262*** 0.52280** 3.22142*** 
 (4.09) (6.78) (6.05) (5.86) (2.56) (8.36) 
Deposit Herfindahl 2.83207 33.00630*** -132.58194***    
 (0.41) (4.14) (6.21)    
Branch Herfindahl    -14.93339*** 12.34532*** -88.90192*** 
    (4.26) (3.32) (8.69) 
Observations 4984 2191 2793 4984 2191 2793 
Number of Banks 32 29 32 32 29 32 
R-squared 0.28837 0.61506 0.30332 0.29096 0.61398 0.31247 
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Table 11: Herfindahls based on Credit Lending and Collateralized Lending - Base Model 
Monthly credit lending market share and collateralized lending market share are used as the explanatory variables of interest.  The 
regression model uses fundamental bank information, excluding macroeconomic and lending practice information.  Absolute value of t 
statistics in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 Herfindahl based on Credit-Lending Herfindahl based on Collateralized-Lending 
 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.12171*** -0.17742*** -0.01298*** -0.12260*** -0.17801*** -0.00996** 
 (32.02) (32.49) (3.38) (32.26) (32.57) (2.56) 
NPL Percentage 0.10722*** -0.01061 0.11955*** 0.10680*** -0.01225 0.10754*** 
 (7.78) (0.43) (12.99) (7.78) (0.50) (11.59) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11 Continued       
Service Interest to Total Income 
Ratio 
12.75995*** 33.21168*** 1.45121*** 12.60076*** 33.11386*** 1.51763*** 
 (20.73) (37.49) (3.28) (20.45) (37.35) (3.42) 
Administrative Cost Percentage -0.00167 0.05085*** -0.01908*** -0.00155 0.05103*** -0.01838*** 
 (0.33) (5.41) (5.23) (0.31) (5.45) (5.01) 
Discount Rates 0.05447* -0.47037*** -0.15229*** 0.04627 -0.48211*** -0.04809* 
 (1.85) (4.77) (6.61) (1.57) (4.94) (1.86) 
Base Lending Rate 0.03077 0.10886 -0.10694*** 0.02682 0.05020 -0.10235*** 
 (1.19) (0.72) (6.62) (1.03) (0.33) (6.38) 
Liquid Ratio 6.38434*** 6.55204*** 0.99594*** 6.41490*** 6.44708*** 0.87874*** 
 (16.99) (8.59) (3.76) (17.14) (8.45) (3.27) 
Credit-Lending Herfindahl 6.29515*** 1.30249 -22.03993***    
 (8.65) (1.58) (10.39)    
Collateralized-Lending Herfindahl    4.97988*** 1.33060** -21.88726*** 
    (9.36) (2.27) (10.31) 
Observations 5242 2334 2908 5242 2334 2908 
Number of Banks 34 31 34 34 31 34 
R-squared 0.38078 0.70322 0.22084 0.38227 0.70356 0.22043 
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Table 12: Herfindahls based on Credit Lending and Collateralized Lending - Adding Lending Practice 
Information 
Average monthly deposit and branch market shares are used as the explanatory variables of interest. The regression model uses 
fundamental bank information, excluding macroeconomic and lending practice information. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
 Herfindahl based on Credit-Lending Herfindahl based on Collateralized-Lending 
 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 All  1991~2000 2001~2009 
Debt-to-Asset Ratio -0.17571*** -0.17422*** -0.05643*** -0.17612*** -0.17455*** -0.05344*** 
 (45.24) (33.38) (9.04) (45.46) (33.39) (8.30) 
NPL Percentage 0.10618*** 0.06996*** 0.12360*** 0.10881*** 0.06798*** 0.11791*** 
  
 
Table 12 continued       
 (8.37) (2.82) (13.17) (8.63) (2.77) (12.40) 
Service Interest to Total Income Ratio 17.45906*** 31.17732*** 1.55065*** 17.30645*** 31.12799*** 1.52768*** 
 (30.20) (35.96) (3.23) (29.92) (35.87) (3.19) 
Administrative Cost Percentage -0.00836* 0.05134*** -0.02207*** -0.00901* 0.05164*** -0.02132*** 
 (1.81) (5.18) (6.03) (1.96) (5.24) (5.77) 
Discount Rates 0.05464** -0.12168 -0.06787*** 0.04504* -0.12362 -0.02143 
 (2.04) (1.24) (2.88) (1.68) (1.27) (0.84) 
Base Lending Rate 0.07884*** 0.08210 -0.10026*** 0.07447*** 0.05016 -0.09795*** 
 (3.42) (0.57) (6.23) (3.23) (0.34) (6.13) 
Liquid Ratio 6.50911*** 3.76100*** 2.00782*** 0.00000 3.74770*** 1.90455*** 
 (18.95) (4.85) (7.08) (19.01) (4.84) (6.55) 
Loss Reserve to Total Lending Ratio 0.11122*** -0.25746* 0.06637*** 0.11190*** -0.25957* 0.06727*** 
 (3.34) (1.81) (3.15) (3.36) (1.82) (3.19) 
Total Assets Growth Rate 0.00692*** 0.00640*** 0.01583*** 0.00694*** 0.00642*** 0.01602*** 
 (11.07) (9.13) (12.18) (11.13) (9.16) (12.46) 
Lending to Deposit Ratio -0.00912*** -0.04600*** -0.00207*** -0.00907*** -0.04578*** -0.00204*** 
 (8.97) (14.06) (3.17) (8.94) (13.98) (3.13) 
Credit-to-Collateralized Lending -0.00116*** -0.26652* -0.00041 -0.00117*** -0.27311* -0.00049 
 (3.17) (1.87) (1.12) (3.20) (1.92) (1.34) 
Credit-Lending Herfindahl 3.83385*** 1.72059** -9.70925***    
 (5.19) (2.01) (4.35)    
Collateralized-Lending Herfindahl    3.64713*** 1.42264** -10.05430*** 
    (6.60) (2.28) (4.45) 
Observations 5027 2233 2794 5027 2233 2794 
Number of Banks 32 29 32 32 29 32 
R-squared 0.54316 0.77128 0.28394 0.54468 0.77140 0.28416 
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Conclusions 
As discussed in the beginning of this paper, too many banks entered the market during 
the 1990s, and the competition became fierce as the government began to encourage 
an industry-wide consolidation.  Banks were eager to gain market share by offering 
higher deposit rates and lower lending rates, resulting in the lowest industry NIMs in 
Asia.   
The overall results show that firm market shares tend to have positive and significant 
impacts on the bank NIMs.  Specifically, the credit lending market share is highly 
significant in affecting the level of NIMs, and its effect is stronger for the second sub-
period.  As discussed earlier, the focus of lending type shifted from collateralized to 
credit lending, and the results here indicate this shift as well.  The results show that, 
given this shift, in the second sub-period one can see that higher credit lending market 
share led to higher NIMs.  Based on the demand side of the superiority hypothesis, 
high credit lending market share increases demand for a bank’s credit loans and raise 
the NIMs.  It means that a relatively popular cash card or credit card may induce more 
potential customers to apply, raising the demand and resulting in higher lending rates. 
The collateralized lending market share, on the other hand, has significant impacts 
between 1999 and 2000, but it loses its significance from 2001 to 2009.  This also 
indicates the shift of lending type.  
There is a dramatic period-to-period change in the statistical significance of the 
service income to total income ratio.  As discussed earlier, banks may charge higher 
lending rates if they have a higher portion of income coming from service fees, and 
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the results are highly significant in the period of 1991-2000.  But the variable 
experiences a drop in significance for 2001-2009.  The results support the demand side 
of Demsetz’s superiority hypothesis.   
For market concentration, we are unable to draw firm conclusions based on the data as 
some regression yield contradictory results, hence providing little support for Bain’s 
collusion hypothesis.  There are two potential reasons. First, the Taiwanese banking 
industry’s concentration is too low for the Herfindahl indices to yield meaningful 
results.  Based on general findings using the Herfindahl indices (Geithman, Marvel 
and Weiss, 1981), if the top four (top eight) firms’ concentration ratios are less than 
50% (70%) the derivative of profits with respect to concentration is essential zero.  
This means that any meaningful results would have to come from data sets which have 
higher concentration.  Second, the biggest banks in Taiwan are all state-owned banks.  
It is quite possible that government banks are not likely to be collusive between each 
other or with private sector rivals, and that government banks do not set prices to 
maximize profits but to maximize the consumer welfare and break even.  Therefore, 
efficiency and unilateral market power may affect the NIMs, and the market 
concentration would not affect them.  
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APPENDIX 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Abnormal Returns and Antitakeover Provision Index 
CAR 2-Day Window Five-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) calculated using the 
market model.  
CAR 5-Day Window Eleven-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) calculated using the 
market model.  
CAR 10-Day Window Twenty-two-day cumulative abnormal return (in percentage points) calculated 
using the market model.  
G-index Taken from GIM (2003), based on 24 antitakeover provisions. Higher index levels 
correspond to more managerial power and low corporate governance measure 
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
Transaction Value Log Transaction Value recorded on SDC 
Cash-Dummy A binary variable: 1 if the deal is at least partially financed by cash, 0 otherwise. 
Acquirer High-Tech Dummy variable: 1 if acquirer is from high tech industries defined by Loughran 
and Ritter (2004), 0 otherwise. 
Target High-Tech Dummy variable: 1 if Target is from high tech industries defined by Loughran and 
Ritter (2004), 0 otherwise. 
Panel C: Acquirer Characteristics 
Acquirer Asset Log of book value of total assets (item6). 
Tobin's Q Market value of assets over book value of assets: (item6−item60 + item25 ∗ 
item199)/item6. 
Leverage Book value of debts (item34 + item9) over market value of total assets 
(item6−item60 + item25 ∗ item199). 
Free Cash Flow (FCF) Operating income before depreciation (item13) – interest expenses (item15) – 
income taxes (item16) – capital expenditures (item128), scaled by book value of 
total assets (item6). 
Diversifying Dummy Dummy variable: 1 if acquirer and target do not share a Fama–French industry, 0 
otherwise. 
Relative Deal-Size Logged Deal value over logged acquirer assets. 
M&A Market Condition The average premium paid for all deals in a given year, computed as the average of 
premium paid based on the target stock price four weeks prior to merger 
announcement in a given year for all announced mergers in our sample. 
Penny Dummy Binary variable: 1 if the target stock price is less than $10.00 on the day of merger 
announcement, 0 otherwise. 
93 
 
 
Chapter 1: Part I Regression Results without Weighting 
 
In what follows we note the importance of our use of inverse variance weighting to 
provide GLS estimates.  Much of event study analysis assumes homoscedasticity, e.g., 
that all CARs are measured with the same precision.  In reality this is not the case.  
Generalized Least Squares tells us how to efficiently adjust for differences in the 
precision of estimates using inverse variance weighting as analyzed in Da Graca and 
Masson (2009).  Many of our text tables have high and significant t-values for the G-
index coefficient.  Here we show that the traditional OLS methodology gives 
remarkably weaker results in all models, and even some sign switches.  We replicate 
each of the GLS regression tables in text with OLS to demonstrate the importance of 
applying the GLS methodology. 
 
Table 4A Corresponding to Table 4 Using GLS 
Target Returns & G-index – Base Model 
The sample consists of 1,427 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 
1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The 
dependent variables are the targets 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement dates. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1%  
  2-Day Window 5-Day Window 10-Day Window 
G-index -0.00035 0.00012 0.00058 
  (0.13) (0.04) (0.19) 
Transaction Value -0.02517* -0.02857* -0.03426* 
  (6.03) (6.59) (7.06) 
Cash-Dummy 0.09650* 0.10163* 0.08880* 
  (7.01) (7.11) (5.55) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.01109 0.01639 0.00568 
  (0.50) (0.71) (0.22) 
Target High-Tech 0.05360** 0.03605 0.06604* 
  (2.44) (1.58) (2.59) 
Intercept 0.36008* 0.38534* 0.44054* 
  (9.61) (9.90) (10.11) 
Number of Obs 1427 1427 1427 
R-squared 0.06801 0.07343 0.06914 
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Table 5A Corresponding to Table 5 Using GLS 
Adding Acquirer Characteristics 
The sample consists of 526 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variable is the acquirer’s 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal return around 
announcement dates.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 1%  
  2-Day Window 5-Day Window 10-Day Window 
G-Index) 0.00153 0.00155 0.00312 
  (0.35) (0.34) (0.65) 
Transaction Value -0.02807* -0.03414* -0.04458* 
  (3.10) (3.65) (4.54) 
Cash-Dummy 0.07614* 0.07974* 0.07385* 
  (3.09) (3.14) (2.76) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.03075 -0.01024 -0.01625 
  (0.84) (0.27) (0.41) 
Target High-Tech 0.04589 0.00677 0.00927 
  (1.27) (0.18) (0.24) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.00152 -0.00051 0.00626 
(0.26) (0.08) (0.97) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.06627 -0.14823 -0.08707 
(0.62) (1.35) (0.76) 
Acquirer FCF 0.39741** 0.31195 0.28478 
(1.97) (1.50) (1.30) 
Acquirer Asset 0.00987 0.01088 0.01556 
(1.03) (1.10) (1.50) 
Diversifying Dummy -0.00530 0.02169 0.02329 
(0.21) (0.85) (0.87) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.01469 -0.01541 -0.00844 
(1.17) (1.19) (0.62) 
Acquirer Deal-Size X Target 
High-Tech 0.01441 0.01455 0.00660 
  (1.14) (1.12) (0.48) 
Intercept 0.31257* 0.35695* 0.36619* 
  (3.56) (3.94) (3.85) 
Number of Obs 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.06725 0.07642 0.08438 
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Table 6A Corresponding to Table 6 Using GLS 
Controlling for M&A Market Condition 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variables are the targets 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  2-Day Window 5-Day Window 10-Day Window 
G-index) 0.00199 0.00201 0.00360 
  (0.46) (0.45) (0.76) 
Transaction Value -0.02446* -0.03056* -0.04084* 
  (2.73) (3.30) (4.19) 
Cash-Dummy 0.08794* 0.09142* 0.08607* 
  (3.60) (3.62) (3.24) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.02399 -0.00356 -0.00926 
  (0.66) (0.10) (0.24) 
Target High-Tech 0.04846 0.00931 0.01193 
  (1.36) (0.25) (0.31) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.00427 -0.00323 0.00342 
 (0.73) (0.53) (0.53) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.09969 -0.18128+ -0.12164 
 (0.95) (1.67) (1.07) 
Acquirer FCF 0.46113** 0.37497+ 0.35070 
 (2.31) (1.82) (1.62) 
Acquirer Asset 0.01093 0.01193 0.01666 
 (1.16) (1.23) (1.63) 
Diversifying Dummy -0.00036 0.02656 0.02840 
 (0.01) (1.05) (1.07) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.01876 -0.01943 -0.01266 
 (1.51) (1.52) (0.94) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.01834 0.01843 0.01066 
  (1.47) (1.43) (0.79) 
M&A Market Condition 0.00436* 0.00431* 0.00451* 
 (4.05) (3.87) (3.86) 
Intercept 0.06120 0.10833 0.10611 
  (0.57) (0.98) (0.92) 
Number of Obs 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.09620 0.10277 0.11026 
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Table 7A Corresponding to Table 7 Using GLS 
Controlling for Penny Stocks 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variables are the targets’ 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  2-Day Window 5-Day Window 10-Day Window 
G-index) 0.00157 0.00192 0.00351 
  (0.36) (0.43) (0.75) 
Transaction Value -0.01799+ -0.02352** -0.02814* 
  (1.84) (2.34) (2.67) 
Cash-Dummy 0.07472* 0.07789* 0.07275* 
  (3.07) (3.10) (2.76) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.03498 -0.01197 -0.01497 
  (0.97) (0.32) (0.38) 
Target High-Tech 0.04810 0.00765 0.00692 
  (1.35) (0.21) (0.18) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.00179 -0.00071 0.00601 
 (0.30) (0.12) (0.95) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.08058 -0.17033 -0.10740 
 (0.77) (1.57) (0.95) 
Acquirer FCF 0.41994** 0.32507 0.25767 
 (2.09) (1.57) (1.19) 
Acquirer Asset 0.01173 0.01498 0.01989** 
 (1.26) (1.57) (1.98) 
Diversifying Dummy -0.01310 -0.01324 -0.00644 
 (1.06) (1.04) (0.48) 
Relative Deal-Size 0.01303 0.01257 0.00486 
 (1.04) (0.98) (0.36) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.05121 0.07105** 0.12282* 
  (1.56) (2.10) (3.47) 
Penny Dummy 0.23990* 0.24271* 0.17608** 
 (3.19) (3.13) (2.16) 
Intercept 0.21257** 0.24528** 0.20717** 
  (2.25) (2.52) (2.03) 
Number of Obs 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.09049 0.10129 0.11335 
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TABLE 10A Corresponding to Table 10 Using GLS 
Combined Value Change 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 
1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The 
dependent variables are the combined company's 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of cumulative 
abnormal returns around announcement dates.  Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  
2-Day 
Combined 
Value Change 
5-Day 
Combined 
Value Change 
10-Day 
Combined 
Value Change 
G-Index 0.00044 -0.00053 -0.00042 
 
(0.42) (0.35) (0.20) 
Transaction Value -0.00128 0.00390 0.00552 
 
(0.60) (1.28) (1.32) 
Cash Dummy 0.00430 0.00218 0.00506 
 
(0.72) (0.26) (0.44) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.00420 -0.00232 0.02656 
 
(0.48) (0.18) (1.54) 
Target High-Tech -0.00191 0.00445 -0.01917 
 
(0.22) (0.36) (1.13) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00006 -0.00143 0.00228 
 
(0.04) (0.70) (0.81) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.02650 -0.05862 -0.09977** 
 
(1.04) (1.60) (2.00) 
Acquirer FCF -0.05259 -0.03186 -0.24744* 
 
(1.08) (0.46) (2.60) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00293 -0.00670** -0.01395* 
 
(1.30) (2.07) (3.16) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.00272 -0.00202 -0.00551 
 
(0.90) (0.47) (0.93) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.00274 0.00112 0.00395 
 
(0.90) (0.26) (0.66) 
Constant 1.03566* 1.05330* 1.11212* 
 
(49.38) (35.00) (27.08) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.01389 0.01728 0.05199 
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TABLE 11A Corresponding to Table 11 Using GLS 
Acquirer Returns & G-index 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) 
between 1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision 
database. The dependent variables are the acquirer’s 2-day, 5-day, 10-day windows of 
cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates. Absolute value of t statistics 
in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  
2-Day 
Acquirer 
Return 
5-Day 
Acquirer 
Return 
10-Day 
Acquirer 
Return 
G-index 0.00061 -0.00069 -0.00074 
(0.52) (0.40) (0.32) 
Transaction Value -0.00130 0.00415 0.00633 
(0.54) (1.17) (1.32) 
Cash Dummy 0.00195 -0.00012 0.00574 
(0.30) (0.01) (0.44) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.00026 0.00298 0.03607+ 
(0.03) (0.21) (1.91) 
Target High-Tech -0.00543 -0.00113 -0.02996 
(0.57) (0.08) (1.57) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.00052 -0.00251 0.00153 
(0.33) (1.08) (0.49) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.04406 -0.09227** -0.15227* 
(1.56) (2.23) (2.70) 
Acquirer FCF -0.04652 -0.03704 -0.26662** 
(0.87) (0.47) (2.49) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00338 -0.00748** -0.01498* 
(1.35) (2.03) (2.99) 
Relative Deal-Size 0.00434 0.00531 0.01457 
(0.66) (0.55) (1.11) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech -0.00003 -0.00104 -0.00171+ 
(0.07) (1.54) (1.86) 
Constant 0.03861+ 0.06494+ 0.11711** 
(1.70) (1.95) (2.58) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.01709 0.02291 0.05679 
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Table 13A Corresponding to Table 13 Using GLS 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows (1) 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) 
between 1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision 
database. The dependent variables are the combined company's cumulative abnormal 
returns around announcement dates for symmetric and asymmetric windows.  
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * 
significant at 1% 
  minus2_plus2 minu2_plus5 minus2_plus10 
G-Index 0.00044 0.00028 0.00225 
 
(0.42) (0.22) (1.36) 
Transaction Value -0.00128 0.00156 0.00278 
 
(0.60) (0.60) (0.84) 
Cash Dummy 0.00430 -0.00090 -0.00141 
 
(0.72) (0.12) (0.15) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.00420 0.00039 0.01712 
 
(0.48) (0.04) (1.24) 
Target High-Tech -0.00191 -0.00343 -0.01564 
 
(0.22) (0.32) (1.15) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00006 -0.00136 0.00058 
 
(0.04) (0.78) (0.26) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.02650 -0.02960 -0.02797 
 
(1.04) (0.95) (0.70) 
Acquirer FCF -0.05259 -0.06418 -0.13578+ 
 
(1.08) (1.08) (1.79) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00293 -0.00526+ -0.00882** 
 
(1.30) (1.91) (2.50) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.00272 -0.00225 -0.00178 
 
(0.90) (0.61) (0.38) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.00274 0.00177 0.00121 
 
(0.90) (0.48) (0.26) 
Constant 1.03566* 1.04774* 1.04651* 
 
(49.38) (40.88) (31.87) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.01389 0.01451 0.03124 
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Table 14A Corresponding to Table 14 Using GLS 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows (2) 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 
1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The 
dependent variables are the combined company's cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates for symmetric and asymmetric windows.  Absolute value of t statistics 
in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  minus5_plus_2 minus5_plus5 minus5_plus10 
G-Index -0.00071 -0.00053 0.00109 
 
(0.54) (0.35) (0.58) 
Transaction Value 0.00138 0.00390 0.00544 
 
(0.52) (1.28) (1.44) 
Cash Dummy 0.00753 0.00218 0.00107 
 
(1.01) (0.26) (0.10) 
Acquirer High-Tech -0.00622 -0.00232 0.01476 
 
(0.56) (0.18) (0.94) 
Target High-Tech 0.00481 0.00445 -0.00837 
 
(0.44) (0.36) (0.54) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q -0.00001 -0.00143 0.00065 
 
(0.00) (0.70) (0.25) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.05062 -0.05862 -0.05292 
 
(1.58) (1.60) (1.17) 
Acquirer FCF -0.02099 -0.03186 -0.11032 
 
(0.34) (0.46) (1.28) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00422 -0.00670** -0.01006** 
 
(1.49) (2.07) (2.51) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.00236 -0.00202 -0.00168 
 
(0.62) (0.47) (0.31) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.00204 0.00112 0.00081 
 
(0.54) (0.26) (0.15) 
Constant 1.04145* 1.05330* 1.05264* 
 
(39.53) (35.00) (28.20) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.01265 0.01728 0.02353 
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Table 15A Corresponding to Table 15 Using GLS 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows (3) 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 
1990 and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The 
dependent variables are the combined company's cumulative abnormal returns around 
announcement dates for symmetric and asymmetric windows. Absolute value of t statistics 
in parentheses + significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
  minus10_plus2 minus10_plus5 minus10_plus10 
G-Index -0.00293+ -0.00299+ -0.00042 
 
(1.82) (1.65) (0.20) 
Transaction Value 0.00128 0.00426 0.00552 
 
(0.40) (1.18) (1.32) 
Cash Dummy 0.01147 0.00548 0.00506 
 
(1.28) (0.54) (0.44) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.00805 0.01276 0.02656 
 
(0.60) (0.85) (1.54) 
Target High-Tech -0.01118 -0.01214 -0.01917 
 
(0.85) (0.82) (1.13) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00157 0.00022 0.00228 
 
(0.73) (0.09) (0.81) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.10005* -0.10213** -0.09977** 
 
(2.59) (2.36) (2.00) 
Acquirer FCF -0.16727** -0.18620** -0.24744* 
 
(2.25) (2.24) (2.60) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00880** -0.01097* -0.01395* 
 
(2.58) (2.87) (3.16) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.00750 -0.00724 -0.00551 
 
(1.65) (1.42) (0.93) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.00676 0.00609 0.00395 
 
(1.47) (1.18) (0.66) 
Constant 1.11854* 1.12763* 1.11212* 
 
(34.97) (31.45) (27.08) 
Observations 525 525 525 
R-squared 0.04891 0.04631 0.05199 
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Table 16A Corresponding to Table 16 Using GLS 
Combined Company's Value Change in Asymmetric Windows under Breakeven G-Index 
The sample consists of 525 completed U.S. mergers and acquisitions (listed in SDC) between 1990 
and 2007 made by firms covered by the IRRC antitakeover provision database. The dependent 
variables are the combined company's cumulative abnormal returns around announcement dates 
for symmetric and asymmetric windows. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses + significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; * significant at 1% 
 
minus10_plus2 minus10_plus5 minus10_plus10 
G-Index -0.00387** -0.00322 -0.00009 
 
(2.00) (1.49) (0.04) 
Transaction Value 0.00165 0.00487 0.00609 
 
(0.49) (1.28) (1.39) 
Cash Dummy 0.01185 0.00638 0.00594 
 
(1.24) (0.60) (0.48) 
Acquirer High-Tech 0.00617 0.01436 0.03032+ 
 
(0.44) (0.91) (1.66) 
Target High-Tech -0.01139 -0.01487 -0.02294 
 
(0.82) (0.96) (1.28) 
Acquirer Tobin's Q 0.00186 0.00039 0.00236 
 
(0.84) (0.16) (0.82) 
Acquirer Leverage -0.09965** -0.10370** -0.10457** 
 
(2.43) (2.26) (1.97) 
Acquirer FCF -0.17426** -0.19976** -0.26468* 
 
(2.27) (2.32) (2.69) 
Acquirer Asset -0.00963* -0.01220* -0.01496* 
 
(2.70) (3.05) (3.23) 
Relative Deal-Size -0.00758 -0.00729 -0.00504 
 
(1.59) (1.36) (0.81) 
Deal-Size X Target High-Tech 0.00684 0.00613 0.00345 
 
(1.43) (1.14) (0.55) 
Constant 1.13088* 1.13629* 1.11509* 
 
(33.18) (29.77) (25.47) 
Observations 487 487 487 
R-squared 0.05316 0.05127 0.05780 
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